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THE FORGOTTEN STORY OF THE MIZRA CHI JEWS:
WILL THE JEWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST EVER BE
COMPENSATED FOR THEIR EXPULSION FROM THE
ARAB WORLD?
Joseph D. Zargarit
Introduction
When people think of the refugee situation in the Middle
East, they often think of the Palestinian refugees of the West Bank
and Gaza. Their situation has been studied, written about, and
debated throughout much of the world. What is often forgotten,
however, is the story of another group of refugees in the Middle
East that were displaced around the same time as the Palestinian
refugees.
Section One of this paper is a historical study of the more
than 850,000' Jews from Arab lands, who were persecuted and
exiled from their countries following World War 112 and the 1948
Arab-Israeli war.3 Jews had lived in these lands for millennia,4
t J.D., University at Buffalo Law School, 2005; B.A., Binghamton University,
2002. This article was inspired by and is dedicated to my grandparents, Yosef
and Daliah Zargari, Kurdish Jews who courageously fled from Iran to Israel in
1950. I also wish to thank Nicole Hart and Michael Zargari for their careful
review and insightful suggestions and the members of the Buffalo Public
Interest Law Journal for their editing assistance.
' See MAURICE M. ROUMANI, THE CASE OF THE JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES:
A NEGLECTED ISSUE 2 (1983) (estimating that in 1948 the Jewish population in
Arab countries was 856,000); cf Malka Hillel Shulewitz & Raphael Israeli,
Exchanges of Populations Worldwide: The First World War to the 1990s, in
THE FORGOTTEN MILLIONS 139 (Malka Hillel Shulewitz ed., 1999) (stating that
there were 900,000 Jews in the Arab world in 1945). It should be noted that
neither of these figures include Iranian Jews, as Iran is a Persian, not an Arab,
country.
2 See NORMAN A. STILLMAN, THE JEWS OF ARAB LANDS IN MODERN TIMES 113-
39 (1991) [hereinafter STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES].
3 See id. at 150 ("The first Arab-Israeli war greatly accelerated the process
whereby the Jewish minorities in the Arab countries were being alienated and
isolated from the larger societies in which they lived.").
4 See Shulewitz & Israeli, supra note 1, at 139 ("Many of [the Jewish]
communities dated back 2,500 years.").
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often legally discriminated against through relegation to a lower
status, as mandated by the Koran, 5 until life became truly
unbearable in the late 1940s with the establishment of the State of
Israel and the resulting Arab anti-Semitism. Since 1948, almost all
of these Jews have left the Arab world and 600,000 of them have
immigrated to Israel, with 300,000 arriving in a three year span
between 1949 and 1951. 6 In present day dollars, it has been
estimated that the value of the Jewish property left behind and
stolen by Arab governments ranges from $8 billion to $30 billion.7
By providing the historical bases for compensation claims from
Middle Eastern Jewry, Section One will examine the following
questions. Why did the Arab governments persecute Jews? Why
did Jews flee the Arab world when they did? On what historical
bases may these Jews pin their hopes of reparations?
Section Two presents a legal analysis of the Jewish refugee
situation. Recently, there has been an effort on behalf of grassroots
Jewish organizations and the Israeli government to seek
compensation for the confiscated property and lost assets of the
Jewish refugees. Current events, such as the overthrowing of the
Ba'ath party in Iraq, and other factors, including the age of the
5 See BERNARD LEWIS, THE JEWS OF ISLAM 21 (1984):
In Muslim law and practice, the relationship between the Muslim
state and the subject non-Muslim communities... was regulated
by a pact called dhimma ... By the terms of the dhimma, these
communities were accorded a certain status, provided that they
unequivocally recognized the primacy of Islam and the supremacy
of Muslims. This recognition was expressed in the payment of the
poll tax and obedience to a series of restrictions defined in detail
by the holy law.
6 See Yehuda Dominitz, Immigration and Absorption of Jews from Arab
Countries, in THE FORGOTTEN MILLIONS, supra note 1, at 155; see also
RoUMANI, supra note 1, at 3-4 (estimating that 586,070 Jews emigrated from
Arab lands to Israel from May 15, 1948 to May 22, 1972, with at least another
200,000 Jews going to France, England and the Americas).
7 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Line: Justice Ministry Expanding
Claims Registry for Jewish Property in Arab Countries (June 10, 2003),
available at http://mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOngeO [hereinafter Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Line] (referring to a report by GLOBES, an
Israeli financial newspaper, as to the estimated property value).
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former refugees, have given hope and a new sense of urgency to
the campaign for compensation. Yet, can compensation ever
happen in the current political landscape of the Middle East? What
legal remedies are available? Will any of them realistically work?
This section will discuss a new department in Israel's Justice
Ministry that registers claims and advocates for compensation. It
will conclude with an analysis of the legal bases and remedies for
refugees and the effectiveness of each.
Section Three begins with the premise that there will be no
compensation or reparation for the Jewish refugees without a
comprehensive regional peace agreement between Israel and its
Arab neighbors. Such an agreement, however, can only be
realized within the framework of a solution to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. The obstacles to such a solution are numerous and
seemingly impenetrable. Nevertheless, this Comment identifies
the major barriers to peace in the region and attempts to find
remedies for each. Such a discussion of peace may seem overly
optimistic given the current state of affairs in the Middle East, but
it is necessary in order to conduct a complete analysis of the
likelihood of compensation. However, pessimism may finally
prevail, as peace is unlikely to occur any time soon and the
remaining refugees will be long gone before any justice is served.
SECTION I: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF JEWS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
A. The Jew as the Dhimmi: The Influence of Shari'ah on Arab
Anti-Semitism
Shari'ah, or Islamic law, distinguishes between religions
that are based on revealed scripture (Judaism, Christianity, and
Zoroastrianism) and religions that are not.8 "Islamic law grant[s]
8 See Donna E. Arzt, The Role of Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad,
Dhimma and Ridda, 8 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 15, 25 (2002).
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the protected status of dhimma (contract or guarantee) to
communities of the other scriptural monotheisms." 9 Prior to the
Middle Ages, dhimmis, as members of these religions were called,
were free to practice their religion and were afforded a limited
amount of tolerance as their monotheistic faiths were seen as
embryonic versions of Islam.' The tolerance and protection
afforded to the dhimmis as a minority population was an
innovation of Islam. Whereas Christianity greatly limited and
often prohibited an individual's ability to follow another religion,
Islam allowed a greater degree of religious freedom and pluralism,
albeit on the condition that Islam would be the dominant religion
in the country. 1
Despite the limited protections of religious freedom,
dhimmis had a duty to recognize the primacy of Islam and the
supremacy of Muslims by paying a poll tax and obeying a series of
restrictions defined by the Koran. 12 The poll tax, or thejizya, was
9 Id. See generally BAT YE'OR, ISLAM AND DHIMMITUDE: WHERE CIVILIZATIONS
COLLIDE (2002) (analyzing the status of Jews and Christians as dhimmis in the
Islamic world).
10 See Arzt, supra note 8, at 25-26.
"1 See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 18-19.
Apart from one episode, of brief duration and minor significance,
the Arab Muslim rulers of the new empire did not repeat the
errors of their predecessors [Christians, Zoroastrians] but instead
respected the pattern of pluralism that had existed [in the Middle
East] since antiquity. This pattern was not one of equality, but
rather of dominance by one group and, usually, a hierarchic
sequence of the others. Though this order did not concede
equality, it permitted peaceful coexistence.
Id. at 19.
12 See id. at 21; see also Arzt, supra note 8, at 27. According to the Charter of
Umar:
Dhimmis could not hold political or judicial office outside their
local community structure and could not testify in litigation
involving Muslims. They could not marry Muslim women and
were forbidden to carry arms, to ride horses or mules, to walk in
the middle of the street, to sell their books or religious articles in
marketplaces, to raise their voices during worship, or to build
churches or synagogues, tombs or houses higher than those of
Muslims. Dhimmis were also required to wear distinctive clothing
Vol. XXIII
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a "symbolic expression of subordination,"' 3 and the failure to
respect Muslims could lead to intolerance, severe reprisals, or even
death.14 When persecution of Jews occurred, which was rare until
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,' 5 it was often justified by
appealing to the Holy Law.' 6 It was argued that when Jews broke
the contract of the dhimma by their perceived disrespect for Islam,
Muslims were no longer bound by their contractual obligations to
refrain from hurting, killing and expropriating Jews. 17  In sum,
and hair styles, which set them apart from Muslims, and to stand
in the presence of Muslims . . . Moreover, if the People of the
Book refused the dhimma compact, they had only the choice of
death or conversion to Islam - either before or after their defeat in
war.
Id.; NORMAN A. STILLMAN, THE JEWS OF ARAB LANDS: A HISTORY AND
SOURCE BOOK 157-58 (1979) [hereinafter STILLMAN, SOURCE BOOK] (stating
that according to the Charter of Umar, if the Jews broke any of its conditions,
then they will no longer be protected as dhimmis and "shall be liable to the
penalties for rebelliousness and sedition.").
13 LEWIS, supra note 5, at 14; see also Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi Factor in the
Exodus of Jews from Arab Countries, in THE FORGOTTEN MILLIONS, supra note
1, at 36 ("The first 'right' is the right to life which was conceded on the
payment of thejizya (Koran IX, 29). Life is not considered a natural right. It is a
right which each Jew and Christian must repurchase annually by paying the poll
tax with humility to the umma. Only then are their lives 'protected."').
14 See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 39.
"5 See id. at 46.
16 See id. at 44.
17 See id. at 45. In a 1066 poem, jurist Abu Ishaq argued that it was legal to rob
and kill Jews because "[ilt is the Jews ... who have violated the [dhimma]
contract that has, therefore, ceased to be binding on the Muslims. The Muslims
and their rulers are absolved from their obligations under dhimma and are thus
free to attack, kill, and expropriate the Jews without illegality, that is, without
sin." Id. See also Bat Ye'or, supra note 13, at 36-37.
Usually the refusal to pay the jizya is considered by all jurists as a
rupture bf the dhimma, which automatically restitutes to the umma
its initial rights of war - to kill and to dispossess the dhimmi
because he has returned to his former status of being a harbi, an
unsubjected infidel . ..Protection is abolished if the dhimmis
rebel against Islamic law, give allegiance to a non-Muslim power,
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
Jews were only able to coexist with Muslims by submitting to
them and by recognizing their own second-class status.' 8
B. European Influence on the Modern Rise of Arab Anti-
Semitism
While Jews often experienced periods of relative calm and
coexistence with their Muslim neighbors, the social situation of
Jews in the Arab world declined after the Middle Ages.' 9 The
Shari'ah and the law of dhimma permitted legal discrimination
against Jews, resulting in a culture that turned Jews into scapegoats
and made them vulnerable to mob actions.20  Starting in the 1800s,
Jews found themselves "exposed to active hostility" for the first
time in centuries. 21 "From the late eighteenth century through the
nineteenth century, expulsion, outbreaks of mob violence, and
even massacres became increasingly frequent., 22 One of the major
refuse to pay the jizya, entice a Muslim from his faith, harm a
Muslim or his property, or commit blasphemy... The moment
the 'pact of protection' is abolished the jihad resumes, which
means that the lives of the dhimmis and their property are
forfeited.
18 See Carole Basri, The Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries: An Examination
of Legal Rights - A Case Study of the Human Rights Violations of Iraqi Jews, 26
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 656, 660-61 (2003).
19 See STILLMAN, SOURCE BOOK, supra note 12, at 109.
During periods of economic, political, and social stability, the
interpretation and application [of the social system of the dhimmi]
tended to be more liberal. Conversely, in times of stress they
tended to be harsher and more restrictive. However, as in any
society based upon the defined superiority of one group and
inferiority of another, the seeds were sown for the eventual
debasement and abuse of the inferior group... [T]he later Islamic
Middle Ages, which continued well into the nineteenth century in
much of the Arab world, was marked by a general decline of the
non-Muslim population and its progressive degradation. There
were exceptions to this trend... [b]ut the overall trend was one of
definite social decline. Id.
20 See Basri, supra note 18, at 662.
21 LEWIS supra note 5, at 168.
22 id.
162 Vol. XI
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factors for the deterioration of the Jewish condition in the Middle
East was the decline in Islamic power and influence as a result of
European imperialism.23 "Loss of power led to loss of confidence,
and this in turn [led] to a loss of tolerance [for Jews]. 24 While
Christians were the major threat to Islam at this time, Jews were
the easiest targets for Muslim hostility, as their small population
and lack of protection from outside powers prohibited them from
adequately defending themselves.25
Whereas Muslim intolerance towards Jews had its roots in
the dhimma relationship, from the late 1800s onwards, Muslim
anti-Semitism was directly influenced by European attitudes
towards Jews.26 Muslims felt the dhimma relationship had been
subverted once the Christian European powers gained a foothold in
the Arab world. 7 To Muslims, the Christian dhimmis were now in
a position of power that would never have happened in the old
Muslim order. Once Muslims felt that the dhimma relationship
had been violated by the newfound power of Christians, they were
no longer obligated to tolerate Christianity or Judaism, as the
contractual bond of the dhimma had been broken.29 When the
dhimma relationship ceased, Muslims were no longer required to
protect religious minorities. The European presence in the Middle
23 See id. at 170.
24 Id.
25 Id; see also BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS: A HISTORY OF THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT 10 (1999).
Christian minorities in Dar al Islam [literally, the House of Islam,
but here signifying the Muslim world] came under the protection
of the European powers and were often shielded from Muslim
hostility by the Ottoman authorities, who either feared retaliation
or needed European financial and political aid. The Jews, lacking
these connections, increasingly fell prey to grassroots hostility.
Id.
26 See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 184.
27 Id. at 185.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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East, combined with the decline of the dhimma relationship,
caused European anti-Semitism 30 to creep into the psyche of the
Muslim world.3' One such instance was when the European blood
libel, the belief that Jews sacrificed Christian children, appeared in
the Arab world.32 The most notable blood libel was the Damascus
Affair of 1840, where Jews were accused of murdering two men to
obtain theirblood for Passover. 33 Sixty-three Jewish children were
taken hostage, leaders of the Jewish community were arrested and
tortured, and mob violence ensued.34 Similarly, the Protocols of
the Elders of Zion, a European book that fantasized about Jewish
conspiracies to take over the world, appeared in the Middle East in
the 1920s and quickly spread throughout the region, further
inflaming the negative attitudes toward Jews.
35
Starting in the early 1900s and reaching its apex with the
Nazis in the 1930s, European groups "devoted great efforts to the
spread of anti-Semitic doctrines among the Arabs. 3 6 For example,
in Iraq, the German Charge d'Affaires published sections of Mein
Kampf in the Arabic newspaper and a 1939 educational curriculum
"praised Hitler for his steps toward eradicating Jews and taught all
school children that the Jewish community of Iraq was an enemy
from within . . . ."37 One reason that such Nazi propaganda was
accepted throughout the Middle East was that the Arab and the
Nazis shared a common enemy: the British and French imperialists
who ruled much of the Arab world.38 The Arabs saw a potential
30 Whereas Islamic discrimination against Jews had been based on the statutory
religious principles of the dhimma, European discrimination had no such
foundations. European anti-Semitism typically portrayed Jews as members of a
conspiracy for global domination and as threats toward Christians.
31 See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 185.
32 See STILLMAN, SOURCE BOOK, supra note 12, at 105.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 185.
36 Id. at 188.
37 See Basri, supra note 18, at 670; see also STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra
note 2, at 116-17 ("[T]he Jews were regarded by much of the population as a
fifth column.").
38 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 93-94.
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benefit to its alignment with the Axis powers, as they had mutual
enemies in the British and French. 39  However, another, more
important, reason for the attractiveness of Nazi anti-Semitism and
the Arab world's willingness to follow it came from the conflict
between Zionism and Palestinian nationalism.4 °
C. Zionism and the Resulting, Arab Anti-Semitism
Zionism is the movement to establish a Jewish state in the
Land of Israel. Traditionally, Zionism was "rooted in age-old
millenarian impulses and values of Jewish tradition and the
flourishing nationalist ideologies of nineteenth-century Europe."'
'
However, Modem Zionism was influenced primarily by European
anti-Semitism. Because Jews could never fully assimilate into the
Christian world, the only place Jews could find safety and freedom
from their status as oppressed minorities would be in their own
land.42 As Theodor Herzl, the founder of Modem Zionism, noted
about European attitudes towards Jews:
After brief periods of toleration, their hostility erupts
again and again. When we prosper, it seems to be
unbearably irritating, for the world has for many
centuries been accustomed to regarding us as the most
39 See id.
40 See id. at 94; see also LEWIS, supra note 5, at 189.
Obviously, a major element in the rise of Arab anti-Semitism is the
Palestine question, and the consequent embitterment of relations
between Jews and Arabs everywhere... [S]ince Zionism and later Israel
both happen to be predominantly Jewish, and since there was
conveniently accessible Jewish minorities in Arab countries, and since
furthermore anti-Semitism provided a ready-made system of themes,
images, and vocabulary for attacks on Jews, the temptation was
obviously very strong to make use of them.
Id.41 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 14.
42 See id. at 20-21.
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degraded of the poor.... Affliction binds us together,
and thus united, we suddenly discover our strength.
Yes, we are strong enough to form a State, and, indeed
a model State.43
Hence, the European anti-Semitism that influenced Arab
anti-Semitism also contributed to the growth of Zionism from a
dream into a reality. The emergence of Zionism, in turn, led to a
Palestinian national movement that over time increased anti-
Semitism throughout the Arab world.
The conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis arose
over a seemingly inevitable problem: two groups of people were
each claiming the same land as their own.44 Despite the fact that
there had been an uninterrupted Jewish presence in the area for
millennia,45 Palestinian antagonism toward the Zionists stemmed
from the fear of territorial displacement, the threat of a foreign
culture and religion, and the perception of European penetration
into the Middle East.46 Whether this threat was justified or not is a
matter of contention. The important point is that the Palestinian
Arabs were opposed to the Zionist movement and, as a result,
hostilities erupted between the two sides.
The Palestinian national movement, however, evoked little
interest in the Arab world before 1929. 47 In August of that year,
Palestinian leaders falsely asserted that Jews had been trying to
43 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State, in THE ZIONIST IDEA: A HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS AND READER 220 (Arthur Hertzberg ed., 1997).
44 See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 189.
45 See Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the
Future Israel-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 298 (1995) ("Long
before the Zionist immigration of the twentieth century, there was a small
Jewish population in Palestine, Eretz Yisrael, mainly in Jerusalem, Hebron,
Tiberias and Safad . . . However, the bulk of the lands owned by Jews in
Palestine prior to 1948 was purchased in the twentieth century as part of the
Zionist effort to prepare for the massive Jewish emigration from the diaspora.").
Hence, the newfound Palestinian objection to the Jewish presence in the area
probably surfaced because the Jewish population in Palestine, while always
there, was sure to increase and had the potential to displace Palestinian Arabs.
46 See MORRIS, supra note 25, at 37, 45.
47 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 94.
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destroy Muslim holy sites.48 Shortly thereafter, an Arab riot at the
Western Wall in Jerusalem resulted in the deaths of 129 Jewish
worshippers. 49 When news of this supposed "Zionist plot" reached
the Arab world, mass protests with an overtly anti-Semitic tone
erupted throughout the Middle East.5 0  The rising tide of Pan-
Arabism 5l reinforced Muslim solidarity with the Palestinians and,
as a corollary, Zionism became the enemy of the Arab world.5 2 As
Arabs became increasingly anti-Zionist, it became more difficult
for the leaders or the population at large to differentiate between
Jews and Zionists. 53  Hence, their anti-Zionism turned to anti-
Semitism, which in turn was directed at their Jewish neighbors.
Unlike the Arab Muslims who, by and large, identified with
the Palestinian national movement, the Jews of the Middle East
were generally apathetic towards the Zionist enterprise in the
1930s, especially when they felt that support for Zionism would be
dangerous.5 4 Where Jews were financially and numerically strong,
as was the case in Iraq, they distanced themselves from Zionism,
55
perhaps because they did not want their vibrant communities and
48 See id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 25, at 112 ("The contention that the Jews
were bent on taking over the [Temple Mount] compound, destroying the Islamic
structures, and rebuilding the Temple had long been a theme in Arab
p ropaganda.").
9 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 93-94. During this riot, over
100 Arab were killed by British troops and local police. See id.
50 See id.
51 Pan-Arabism was the Arab nationalist movement that sought to replace
Turkish dominance over the Middle East, in the form of the Ottoman Empire,
with Arab dominance. See MORRIS, supra note 25, at 26-32.
52 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 95-98.
" See id. at 180.54See id. at 98-99. These trends where Jewish communities would publicly
demonstrate or refrain from demonstrations regarding Zionism mirrored Jewish
attitudes towards Nazi persecution, as well organized Jews that lived in Arab
countries, like Egypt, demonstrated against Nazi anti-Semitism, whereas poor or
lesser-organized Jews in Syria and Lebanon felt that "overt communal
demonstrations [against Nazism] would be disastrous." Id. at 108-09.
" See id. at 98.
2004-2005
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lifestyles to be disrupted by accusations that they, as Jews, were
connected with the Zionist movement. For instance, Rabbi
Sassoon Khadduri, the leader of the Jewish community in
Baghdad, publicly disassociated Iraqi Jewry from Zionism after
several Jews were killed and attacked by anti-Zionist Muslims. 56
Leaders of the Iraqi Jewish community did not view Zionism as a
solution to their problems since "they were still convinced that
identification with the Zionist enterprise in the Land of Israel
would serve only to heighten the threat to their community." 57
Similarly, in countries like Syria, where the Jewish population was
small and poor, Jews asserted their anti-Zionist stance out of
intimidation.58 However, in other places, such as Morocco and
Tunisia, Jews felt relatively safe and therefore publicly supported
Zionism and its goals. 59 Nevertheless, these incidents in Morocco
and Tunisia were the exceptions, not the rule. The general trend
was that the majority of Jews in the Arab world were not ardent
supporters of Zionists.
60
Despite their apathy towards Zionism, during the 1930s, the
Jews of the Middle East saw a steady deterioration of their position
and a steady increase in their persecution. 61 Zionism, Nazi anti-
Semitism, European imperialism and the consequent shattering of
the dhimma were all factors in the rise of Arab anger towards Jews
during this decade. However, it was the next decade that
witnessed a complete destruction of Jewish life in Arab lands.
6 2
D. World War II. Arab Nationalism, and the Riots that
Followed
World War II was a pivotal and dangerous time for Jews
56 See id. at 102.
57 ITAMAR LEVIN, LOCKED DOORS: THE SEIZURE OF JEWISH PROPERTY IN ARAB
COUNTRIES 6 (Rachel Neiman trans., 2001).
58 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 98.
'9 See id. at 99.
60 See id. at 138.
61 See id. at 112.
62 See id.
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around the world; and Jews of the Middle East were no
exception. 63  "[M]any Arab nationalists admired German and
Italian militarism, and there was widespread sympathy among
Arabs for the Axis, which was the enemy of colonialist Britain and
France.",64 As a result, Jews in the Middle East often faced legal
and cultural discrimination and persecution from their Arab
neighbors. In Iraq, after a military coup deposed the pro-British
government, Jews were seen as allies of the British, and hence
were considered a "fifth column." 65  Yet, the British failed to
intervene on behalf of the Jews in 1941, when a massive Arab riot,
known as the Farhild, resulted in the looting of 586 Jewish
businesses, the pillaging of 911 Jewish homes, the killing of 179
Jews and the orphaning of 242 children. 66  Similarly, in North
Africa, where Tunisian Jews were under Nazi control and Algerian
Jews were under Vichy control, anti-Jewish laws were passed, and
Jews were placed into forced-labor camps. Extortion, mob attacks,
and physical abuse against Jews became commonplace.67
The Jews of the Middle East were transformed by the
events that occurred in their countries during World War II. Most
importantly, Jews became more receptive towards Zionism,
realizing that Europeans would no longer protect them and the
Arabs no longer tolerated them.68 As historian Bernard Lewis
notes, "Jews in Arab countries had, for the most part, been either
indifferent or hostile to Zionism, which was seen as a
63 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 113.
64 Id.
651 Id. at 116-17.
66 See id. at 119; see also Basri, supra note 18, at 672 ("As news of the attack
began to spread, a mob of thousands sprung up and was spurred on by active
participation of the police. The mob killed any Jew they encountered, dragging
Jews from buses, taxis and homes. Jewish women were raped repeatedly and
then killed.").
67 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 121-36, 180 ("World War II
demonstrated to the Jews of Arabs lands with painful clarity just how vulnerable
they were.").
68 See id. at 136-39.
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predominantly European movement. The conversion of Arab Jews
to Zionism was ... a direct result of persecution.' '69 Hence, the fate
of the Middle Eastern Jews would now be linked to the fate of
worldwide Jewry, with whom they shared a common destiny of
anti-Semitism and discrimination.7 °
The years following World War II were especially difficult
for Jews of the Arab world. With the end of the war came a
renewed interest in Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism, which
consequently led to anti-Semitism. 71 "Between 1941 and 1948
there were numerous outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence in Iraq,
Syria, Egypt, Southern Arabia, and North Africa, in which
hundreds of Jews were killed or injured, while far greater numbers
found their work places sacked and their houses destroyed, leaving
them homeless and destitute. 72  In Libya, for instance, Arab
nationalists tried to gain legitimacy for their aspirations of Libyan
independence by directing old and new popular resentment against
Jews, who were already easy targets because of the situation in
Palestine and their ties with the British colonialists. 73 Therefore, in
1945, Libyan Jewry witnessed particularly cruel pogroms whereby
125 Jews were killed, 92 children were orphaned, 159 were
hospitalized, numerous women were raped and many Jews were
compelled to convert to Islam. 74 In Syria, similar riots erupted in
1945 and 1947, resulting in the denial of basic rights to Jews,
restrictions on immigration to Israel, destruction of Jewish
property and the freezing of Jewish bank accounts.75 In Aden
(located in present-day Yemen), Arabs rioted in 1947 in protest of
the United Nations partition plan of Palestine into Arab and Jewish
sections.76 In its aftermath, the Great Synagogue of Aden was
69 LEWIS, supra note 5, at 189-90.
70 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 136-39.
71 See id. at 141-48.
72 LEWIS, supra note 5, at 190.
73 See RENZO DE FELICE, JEWS IN AN ARAB LAND 191 (Judith Roumani trans.,
1985).
74 See id. at 192-95.
75 See ROUMANI, supra note 1, at 7.
76 See id. at 8.
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destroyed and 100 Jews were killed.77
E. The 1948 Arab Israeli War: The Beginning of the End for
Middle Eastern Jewry
The 1948 Arab-Israeli War was the proverbial "straw that
broke the camel's back" as it was the catalyst for the mass exodus
of Jews from Arab countries.78 However, it was not the sole cause
of the exodus. The culture of discrimination, as promoted by
Islamic law (the dhimma), Arab nationalism, and European anti-
Semitism, was a major reason why the Jews of the Middle East
became refugees. This culture of discrimination came to a fore in
the 1940s, when Jews were increasingly alienated as their societies
turned to Arab nationalism, which had a strong ethnic (Arab) and
religious (Islamic) nature. 79 This Arab nationalism linked the Jews
of the Arab world with the Zionists and viewed both as enemies.
Therefore, once the State of Israel was established, the position of
Middle Eastern Jewry was so weakened that it exposed them to "a
new militancy that [left] no place for those who deviate[d] from
the rule.",80 Hence, the conditions necessary for the mass exodus
of Jews from the Arab world were already present by 1948. The
Arab-Israeli War simply "accelerated the process whereby the
Jewish minorities in the Arab countries were being alienated and
isolated from the larger societies in which they lived.",81
Once the 1948 War began to turn in Israel's favor, "incidents
of anti-Jewish violence began to break out in the Arab countries,' 82
and these incidents ultimately led to the mass exodus of Jews. In
June of 1948 alone, 42 Moroccan Jews were killed, rioters killed
13 or 14 in Libya, a bomb in Egypt killed 20, and property damage
77 See id.
78 STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 149.
79 See id.
go LEWIS, supra note 5, at 190.
81 STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 150.
82 Id. at 152.
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escalated.83 Violence continued throughout the summer and the
rest of the year, resulting in more deaths, more arrests of Jews,
more discriminatory laws and more property damage. 84  In a
December 2003 speech to the United Nations, Ambassador Dan
Gillerman of Israel gave the following account of the effects the
first Arab-Israeli War had on Middle Eastern Jewry:
While the history of the 20th century reveals a
consistent, widespread pattern of state-sanctioned
discrimination, antisemitism [sic] and persecution of
Jewish minorities by Arab regimes, upon the
declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, the status of
Jews in Arab countries changed dramatically for the
worse. As virtually all Arab countries declared war, or
backed the war against Israel, Jews were either
uprooted from their countries of residence or became
subjugated, political hostages of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. In virtually all cases, as Jews were forced to
flee, individual and communal properties were seized
and/or confiscated without any compensation provided
by the Arab governments involved, in clear violation
of international human rights norms.85
As Ambassador Gillerman noted, the persecution that Jews
suffered in the immediate aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War
83 See id.
84 See id. at 152-54. For example, Iraq court-martialed 310 Jews during the early
days of the War, its government removed Jews from public life, Jewish students
were prohibited from studying in high schools or universities, Jews were forced
to pay for the Iraqi war effort against Israel, Jews were restricted from buying
and selling property, and Jews could not travel abroad. The effects of these laws
were to prohibit Jewish emigration. See Basri, supra note 18, at 675-78.
85 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ambassador Dan Gillerman,
Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, on Agenda Item 37:
The Situation in the Middle East (Dec. 2, 2003), available at
http://mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH~olmO [hereinafter Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ambassador Dan Gillerman] (copy on file with
the author).
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was the final push in their mass exodus from their homelands.
The-Jewish exodus from the Arab world came in two stages. The
first stage, from 1949 to 1951, witnessed 300,000 Jews immigrate
to Israel.86 Continued persecution, messianic enthusiasm after the
establishment of Israel and the easing of travel restrictions to Israel
led to the mass exodus of virtually every Libyan, Iraqi, Syrian and
Yemeni Jew by the early 1950s. 87 By 1951, the nascent State of
Israel absorbed 300,000 of these Jews, many in dramatic round-
the-clock airlifts. 88 "[A]fter a few years there were no Jews left in
86 See supra note 6.
87 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 155-68. The New York Times
gave this account of the fate of Iraqi Jewry:
While the number of Jews in Iraq has dwindled to near extinction,
they used to make up one of the oldest and most storied
communities in the Diaspora. Many traced their origins to the
sixth century B.C. and the release, by Cyrus the Great, of the Jews
held captive in Babylon. By 1948, the year of Israel's
independence, the Jews of Baghdad numbered nearly 120,000.
The trouble for Iraq's Jews began in the 1930's with the end of
the British Mandate, when successive Iraqi governments
embarked on discriminatory policies against them. With Israel's
independence, the Iraqi government at first discouraged and
finally allowed the Jews to emigrate, and in 1950 enacted a law
requiring that any Jews leaving for Israel renounce their
citizenship. By the early 1950's, all but a few thousand of Iraq's
Jews had fled. Many of those who remained left after 1969, when
a dozen men, seven of them Jews, were hanged from lampposts in
Liberation Square in Baghdad on charges of treason. Saddam
Hussein, then a senior Baath Party member, toured the scene.
Today, the Jewish community in Iraq has dwindled to just 13
members. The old Jewish neighborhoods along the Tigris River
have long since been bulldozed. An estimated 250,000 to 400,000
Iraqi natives and their descendants now live in Israel, with 40,000
more elsewhere, primarily in North America, Britain and
Australia.
Dexter Filkins, The Struggle for Iraq: Repatriation: Iraqi Council Weighs
Return of Jews, Rejecting It So Far, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A6.
88 See Dominitz, supra note 6, at 155. See generally STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES,
supra note 2, at 155-68 (describing the exodus of the Jews and the air lifts).
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Libya, fewer than 500 remained in Iraq, and about 1,000 stayed in
Yemen." 89 An additional 80,000 Jews fled other Asian countries,
like Iran.90 While Jews were not formally expelled, their exodus
cannot be termed "voluntary" as Jews would have had to face
continuing humiliation, violence, imprisonment and executions had
they stayed. 91 Their "choice" to leave was not much of a choice.
The second exodus of Jews from Arab lands was slower than the
first, yet it resulted in virtually the same thing - the flight of entire
Jewish communities from their homelands. During this exodus, it
was the Jews of North Africa (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and
92Algeria) who left. In the months following the 1956 War, in
which Great Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt for
nationalizing the Suez Canal, continued legal discrimination
against Jews (Jews were declared enemies of the state), the
freezing of Jewish bank accounts, and the criminalization of
Zionism led to the mass flight of Egyptian Jewry.93 Moroccan and
89 Dominitz, supra note 6, at 164.
90 See id. at 157.
91 See Arthur J. Goldberg, Findings of the Tribunal Relating to the Claims of
Jews from Arab Lands, in THE FORGOTTEN MILLIONS, supra note 1, at 208.
Arab governments have neglected the fact that the exodus was a result of
persecution and ill treatment of Jews. They have frequently made the claim that
Jews should not be compensated because their choice to leave was voluntarily.
See Press Release, Fourth Committee Concludes Debate on UN Relief Agency
for Palestine Refugees; Deteriorating Middle East Situation, Agency's Financial
Problems Highlighted, U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 57th Sess., U.N. Doc.
GA/SPD/252 (May 11, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2002/gaspd252.doc.htm:
Speaking in the exercise of the right of reply, the representative of
Lebanon quoted from the statement of the Israeli delegate, who
had said that 'hundreds of thousands' of Jews had been forced to
flee Arab lands where they had lived for centuries. Through such
statements, the Israeli delegate had said that the Arabs had forced
Jews to flee the Arab countries. Through such statements, the
Israeli delegate was trying to justify the displacement of the
Palestinians. He rejected Israel's unfounded claim. The Jews who
had left Arab countries had left by choice.
92 See Dominitz, supra note 6, at 164.
93 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 169; see also Samuel G.
Freedman, Are Jews Who Fled Arab Lands to Israel Refugees, Too?, N.Y.
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Tunisian independence caused Jews to fear for their fate, as both
countries became members of the Arab League and were pressured
to join the anti-Jewish and anti-Israel Arab chorus. 94 In Algeria,
Jews, along with many French Algerians, fled upon independence,
as an Algerian Arab government was formed.95 After Israel
decisively defeated Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the 1967 Six-Day
War, more Jews fled Arab countries, as there was renewed
hostility, incitement, economic boycotts, and infringements on the
civil rights of Jews.96 More than 800,000 Jews fled the Arab world
in the decades following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, with over
300,000 leaving in the first exodus between 1948 and 1951.
97
Israel absorbed over 600,000, or three-fourths, of the total
amount. 98 As of 2003, barely 14,000 Jews were left in the Arab
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at BI 1 ("After the overthrow of King Farouk in Egypt in a
military coup in 1952 and Israel's invasion of Sinai in 1956, Egypt declared
Jews enemies of the state.").
94 See Dominitz, supra note 6, at 164; see also STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES,
supra note 2, at 173:
The natural progression in both countries toward increased
identification with the rest of the Arab world (first Morocco, then
Tunisia, entered the Arab League in 1958) only widened the gulf
between Muslims and Jews. Furthermore, government steps to
reduce Jewish communal autonomy, such as Tunisian Law No.
58-78 of July 11, 1958, which dissolved the Jewish Communal
Council of Tunis and replaced it with the Provisional Commission
for the Oversight of Jewish Religious Matters, having far more
circumscribed authority, had negative psychological
consequences for Jews, who saw their traditional structures under
siege. The official pressure on Jewish educational institutions for
arabization [sic] and cultural conformity only succeeded in
feeding the Jews' worst fears, rather than fostering their
integration.
95 See Dominitz,'supra note 6, at 164 (noting that the whole Algerian Jewish
community left, but most went to France, as they still considered themselves to
be French); see also STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 173.
96 See Dominitz, supra note 6, at 164-65.
9' See id. at 155.
98 See id.
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world, as the following chart illustrates:
Comparisons of Jewish Populations in the Arab World: 1948,
1976 and 200399
1948 1976 2003
Morocco 265,000 17,000 5,800
Algeria 140,000 500 0
Tunisia 105,000 2,000 2,000
Libya 38,000 20 Less than 10
Egypt 75,000 100 200
Iraq 135,000 400 Less than 100
Syria 30,000 4,350 4,000
Lebanon 5,000 500 60
Yemen 55,000 1,000 2,000
Aden 8,000 0 0
Total 856,000 25,870 14,170
When Jews fled their native Arab countries, they were
often prevented from taking their assets or property across borders.
In May 2003, Representative Frank Pallone of New Jersey made
this statement on the floor of the House regarding the issue of
confiscation of Jewish property:
Jews in Arab nations were forced to forfeit the lives
they had worked so hard to achieve - to abandon their
homes and livelihoods. They had to turn their backs
on centuries of Jewish history, culture and community.
They had to leave behind schools, synagogues,
hospitals and businesses - all without compensation
99 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 177 (listing populations of
Jews in Arab countries); see also ROUMANI, supra note 1, at 2 (listing the
population of Jews in 1948 and 1976); Joint Statement of the Int'l Ass'n of
Jewish Lawyers and Jurists and the World Jewish Congress, Rights of Refugees
to Compensation and/or Restitution of Property, 36 JUSTICE 7 (Autumn 2003),
available at http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/pdf/JUSTICE_36.pdf (last
accessed Jan. 14, 2004) (listing populations of Jews in the Arab world in 2003).
Vol. XXIII
The Forgotten Story
and all confiscated by the various Arab
governments.1
00
The Israeli financial newspaper, GLOBES, reported that the private
property owned by Iraqi, Egyptian and Syrian Jews was worth at
least $10 billion and possibly as much as $30 billion.' 0 ' In Iraq
alone, the value of the property left behind (Jewish assets were
frozen by the Iraqi government in 1951, effectively stripping them
of all they owned) has been estimated to be between $150 and
$200 million. 0 2 At today's present value, the total loss of Jewish
property in Iraq may be as high as $4 billion. 103 Similarly, the real
value of Jewish assets in Egypt ranged from $3 to $4 billion.'0 4
These values do not include the assets left behind in Algeria,
Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Aden, Lebanon, or Morocco.
Furthermore, these numbers do not reflect the Worth of religious
and cultural artifacts that may not be monetarily valuable, but are
priceless nonetheless.
Summary
The Jewish exodus from the Arab world was not
precipitated by any single event, but was rather the result of a
series of events and factors. The lesser-status afforded to Jews by
the dhimma was historically a basis for persecution and formed a
culture of discrimination against Jews that lasted until their flight
100 149 CONG. REC. H3737 (May 7, 2003) (statement of Rep. Frank Pallone).101 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Line, supra note 7; see also
Jessica McCallin, Jews Demanding Compensation from the Arab World,
MUSLIM NEWS, Dec. 20., 2002, available at http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/
paper/index.php?article= 1074.
102 See STILLMAN, MODERN TIMES, supra note 2, at 163.
103 See Itamar Levin, Jewish Property in Iraq, Egypt and Syria: Can it be
Retrieved in Court?, 36 JUSTICE 9 (Autumn 2003), available at
http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/pdf/JUSTICE-36.pdf.
104 See id. at 11.
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from the Islamic world. 10 5 Yet, in the modem imperialistic age,
where the Christian dhimmis were dominant, the traditional
dhimma relationship collapsed. 10 6 Since Muslims were no longer
required to tolerate the dhimmis, persecution of Jews ensued as
they were a small and unprotected people.'0 7  The imperialist
powers also introduced classical European anti-Semitism to the
Muslim world, from which more discrimination and persecution
followed. 108 Zionism and Pan-Arabism further reinforced the Arab
feeling that Jews, as a group, were their enemies. 109 This feeling
reached its climax with Arab sympathy to the Axis powers during
World War II and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which pitted the
Jews of Israel against the Arab world."l 0 The resulting actions
taken by Arab governments and Arab citizens, whether they were
anti-Jewish laws or popular riots, made life untenable for Jews and
finally led to their mass exodus from the Arab world."' After
more than two millennia of life in the Arab world, the Jewish
presence there ceased.
SECTION II: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS OF
JEWISH REFUGEES
A. The Relevance of Current Events to the Issue of
Compensation
Current events have underscored the relevance and urgency
of compensation for Jewish refugees of the Arab world. The 2000
Camp David peace negotiations introduced a plan to create a fund
for Jewish refugees, setting a possible precedent for future peace
105 See supra note 20.
106 See supra note 29.
107 See supra notes 24-25.
108 See supra note 30.
109 See supra notes 51-53.
'10 See supra note 78.
111 See supra note 85.
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summits and agreements." 2  Recent initiatives by grassroots
Jewish organizations have sought to bring both "historical attention
and financial compensation to Jewish refugees."" 3 In 2003, the
proposed Israeli-Palestinian Peace Enhancement Act would have
amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961114 to include a clause
stipulating that any peace agreement shall provide "a permanent
resolution for both Palestinian refugees and Jewish refugees from
Arab countries." "15 Further, the consequences of the War in Iraq,
with the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party and the
possibility for democracy, have opened up an "opportunity to
reconcile Iraqi Jews with other Iraqis" and the hope for reparations
of lost assets and property."16  In January 2004, President
Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, intent on ending his country's
international isolation, said that he is ready to compensate Jewish
refugees that fled from his country.'1 7 Finally, the old age of the
112 See LEVIN, supra note 57, at 229; see also U.S. Embassy in Australia,
Department of State Washington File, Transcript: Clinton Interview by Israeli
Television on Peace Talks (July 28, 2000), available at http://usembassy-
australia.state.gov/hyper/2000/0728/epf50 l.htm..
113 Freedman, supra note 93.
114 22 U.S.C. § 2351 (1961).
115 H.R. REP. No. 108-105, at 78 (May 16, 2003), available at
http://www.house.gov/intemationalrelations/democratic/108_105_1 .pdf.
116 Basri, supra note 18, at 658.
117 See Yoav Stem, Report: Israeli Delegation to Visit Libya Later This Month,
HA'ARETZ (Jan. 6, 2004), available at http://www.haaretzdaily.com/
hasen/spages/380134.html (last accessed Jan. 7, 2004) (copy on file with the
author) ("Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi was quoted as saying he is ready
to compensate Libyan Jews whose properties were confiscated."); see also Zvi
Bar'el, Gadhafi 's Son Says Libyan Jews Entitled to Compensation, HA'ARETZ,
available at http://www.haaretzdaily.com/ hasen/spages/413084.html (last
accessed Apr. 7, 2004) (copy on file with the author) ("Libyan Jews will be able
to receive compensation for property confiscated when they left the country, the
son of Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi told the Egyptian weekly Al-Ahram Al-
Arabi...."); Report: Israeli Delegation with Mossad Officials to Visit Libya as
Kadhafi Agrees to Compensate Libyan Jews, AL BAWABA (January 6, 2004), at
http://www.albawaba.com (copy on file with the author) ("Libyan leader
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refugees themselves has spurred a new urgency in documenting
their stories and getting reparations for them.118 All of these events
have brought the issue of compensation for Jewish refugees to the
international spotlight, making a settlement of claims possible, if
not entirely probable.
B. What is Israel doing? The Department for the Rights of
Jews from Arab Countries
Prior to July 2000, the Israeli government refrained from
making any public statement on the matter of compensation for
Jewish refugees.1 9 In the 1950s, Israel's identity was based on the
perception that it was the chosen home for world Jewry. 120 Hence,
Israel viewed Jews from the Arab world as Zionist pioneers
coming home to the motherland and not as refugees whose
property was confiscated. 12 1 Geopolitics in the 1950s also lent
itself to the view that the Jewish flight from the Arab world and the
Palestinian flight from Israel were part of a legitimate population
exchange, neglecting the reasons behind the exodus and its
consequences.122 As then Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion
noted, the Arab countries should "settle [the Palestinians] among
their own people," just as Israel had done with Jews of Arab
Moamer Kadhafi is quoted as saying he is ready to compensate Libyan Jews
whose properties were confiscated.... He called to compensate those that lost
their assets and money during the early stages of the revolution. Kadhafi rose to
power after the 1969 Socialist Revolution. He said the state must try those who
gained control of other people's properties in the name of the revolution.").
118 The American Sephardi Federation, an organization dedicated to Middle
Eastern Jewry, warns potential claimants that, "[t]ime is of the essence! With the
passage of time, crucial evidence and eyewitness testimonies are being lost
forever." American Sephardi Federation: Jewish Refugees from Arab
Countries, at http://www.jewishrefugees.org/Claims%20Forms.htm (last
accessed Jan. 31, 2004).
119 See LEVIN, supra note 57, at 229.
120 See Freedman, supra note 93.
121 See id.
122 See id.
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countries. 123 Even after the Camp David Peace Treaty with Egypt,
which called for the establishment of a joint claims committee,
Israel neglected to bring up the issue of compensation.' 24  Israel's
strategic interest in peace outweighed its desire for reparations.'
25
The country chose not to jeopardize an already fragile peace
agreement with Egypt by insisting on compensation. 126 Israel also
feared that asking for compensation on behalf of the Jewish
refugees would open up a Pandora's Box for similar claims made
by Palestinians against Israel.1
27
Then, in July 2000, several days after the failed Middle
East Peace Summit at Camp David, President Bill Clinton
announced, in an interview with Israeli television, that Jewish
refugees should be compensated as part of a peace plan.' 28 He
stated:
There is, I think, some interest, interestingly enough,
on both sides, in also having a fund which
compensates the Israelis who were made refugees by
the war, which occurred after the birth of the State of
123 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Arab Refugees: Statement to the
Knesset by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion (Oct, 27, 1961), available at
http://mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHO1amO (last accessed Mar. 26, 2005) (Ben-
Gurion also stated that since the number of Palestinians that left Israel was the
same amount as the Jews who left Arab countries, "what has taken place is an
unplanned, but defacto exchange of populations....").
124 See Freedman, supra note 93; see also LEVIN, supra note 57, at 228 ("[O]ne
clause in the [Camp David] agreement mentioned the establishment of a joint
claims committee. But the committee was never formed, mainly because Israel
allowed the matter to be forgotten.").
125 See Freedman, supra note 93.
126 See id.
127 See LEVIN, supra note 57, at 227-28 ("[I]t is very likely that Israel-
Palestinian negotiations on refugee compensation will factor in many other
calculations, and Israel prefers not to get involved too early in the game .... Israel
did not want to open the Pandora's box equating Jewish and Palestinian
assets.").
128 See LEVIN, supra note 57, at 229.
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Israel. Israel is full of people, Jewish people, who
lived in predominantly Arab countries who came to
Israel because they were made refugees in their own
land.
That's another piece of good news I think I can reveal
out of the summit. The Palestinians said they thought
those people should be eligible for compensation, as
well. So we'll have to set up a fund and we will
contribute. I went to the G-8 in Okinawa in part to
give them a report, and I asked the Europeans and the
Japanese to contribute, as well. And there will be
other costs associated with this. So it will not be
inexpensive. 129 .
Following President Clinton's statements, Israel made its position
known. The Office of the Israeli Prime Minister stated, "Israel
supports the establishment [of] a framework to allocate
compensation to persons who suffered as a result of the 1948 War,
that would also grant compensation to Jews from Arab
countries."
' 130
On March 3, 2002, pursuant to Decision Number 1544, the
Israeli Government formed the Department for the Rights of Jews
from Arab Countries and Iran.' 31 Prior to the formation of this
129 See U.S. Embassy in Australia, supra note 112; see also LEVIN, supra note
57, at 229.
130 LEVIN, supra note 57, at 229 (quoting the Office of the Prime Minister of
Israel).
131 See Israel Ministry of Justice, Rights of Jews From Arab Lands: About Us,
available at http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJEng/Rights+of+Jews+from+Arab+
Lands/AboutUs.htm (last accessed Mar. 26, 2005). Decision Number 1544 was
renewed by the Israel on December 28, 2003 in Government Decision Number
1250. Decision Number 1250 also broadened the scope of the previous law by
establishing a steering committee that will centralize the handling of the subject
and coordinate the policies of various international bodies devoted to Jewish
refugees. Furthermore, Decision Number 1250 allocates a budget to implement
the claims process and to develop the infrastructure of the Department for the
Rights of Jews from Arab Countries and Iran. See Israel Ministry of Justice,
Rights of Jews From Arab Lands: Government Decision n. 1250, December 28,
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department, there had existed a relatively ineffective office in the
Department of Justice that registered claims of only Iraqi,
Egyptian, Syrian and Yemeni Jews. 32 The mandate of the new
department includes the registration of claims from all the Jews
who escaped Arab countries, as well as those that left Iran, since
the 1940s. 133  Furthermore, the Department's activities are not
limited to Jews that immigrated to the State of Israel - its scope
reaches all Jews originally from Arab lands and their descendants
living in the Diaspora.
134
The Department for the Rights of Jews from Arab
Countries and Iran has several responsibilities. 135  First, it is
involved in the preservation, documentation and processing of
private claims and other documents collected since the 1950s and
stored in the Ministry of Justice. 136 Second, starting in 2003, the
Department began to expand the collection and registration of data
dealing with Jewish private and communal property through the
use of claims forms available in a number of languages.' 3 The
data will be used for both legal and historical purposes.' 38 The
legal aspects are to analyze discriminatory laws that led to the
2003, available at http://www.justice.gov.ii/MOJEng/Rights+of+Jews+from+
Arab+Lands/Govermnent+Decision.htm (last accessed Mar. 26, 2005) (copy on
file with the author).
132 See Israel Ministry of Justice, Rights of Jews From Arab Lands: About Us,
supra note 131.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See Israel Ministry of Justice, Rights of Jews From Arab Lands: About Us,
supra note 131; see also Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Line, supra
note 7 ("After decades of delay, the Ministry of Justice is expanding its registry
of property claims by Jews from Arab countries .... Officials are compiling
numerous statements about private and communal property left behind in Arab
countries and electronically archiving thousands of forms filed by immigrants
from Arab nations in the 1950s.").
138 See Israel Ministry of Justice, Rights of Jews From Arab Lands: About Us,
supra note 131.
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Jewish exodus, to provide assessments for compensation, to study
similar claims that were submitted in other contexts (Holocaust
claims), and to lobby in appropriate forums (United States
Congress, the European Parliament, etc.). 139  The historical
purposes of collecting the data will culminate in the formation of
an Internet site giving personal testimonies and descriptions of the
property abandoned in the Arab world. 40 This historical database
will be used by Israel to remember the tragedies that these Jews
faced and to counter Arab propaganda that denies the expulsion
and persecution of Jews. 14 1 The goal of this effort to inform the
international community about the Jewish exodus is to widen the
"campaign for justice for Jews from Arab lands and Iran" and lay
the groundwork for future negotiations on compensation.
42
In a December 2003 Cabinet Communiqu&, the Justice
Ministry announced that it will cooperate with other ministries,
Jewish organizations, and Jewish community representatives in
order to achieve the goals of the Department for the Rights of Jews
from Arab Countries. 143 In fact, it has been Israeli and Diaspora
Jewish organizations that have kept the campaign for
compensation alive through the decades following the exodus, up
until President Clinton's statement. One such organization, the
World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries, held several
conferences, published booklets, and lobbied the United States
Congress during the 1970s and 1980s - a time when Israel was
generally uninvolved in the campaign for compensation.
44
Recently, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations, the World Jewish Congress, and the American
Sephardi Federation formed Justice for Jews from Arab
Countries.145 As a coalition of grassroots organizations, Justice for
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 id.
143 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet Communique, (Dec. 28,
2003), available at www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOo430.
'44 See LEVIN, supra note 57, at 218.
145 See Justice for Jews from Arab Countries, available at
http://www.jewishrefugees.org/JusticeForJews.htm (last accessed Feb. 1, 2004);
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Jews from Arab Countries has been instrumental in bringing the
issue of Jewish refugees to the international arena and in the
collecting and processing of claims. 146 Without the lobbying and
public relations efforts of such grassroots and community-based
organizations, the campaign for compensation would be
significantly less organized and potent.' 
47
Israel, along with these Jewish organizations, has argued
that it received no financial assistance from the United Nations or
non-governmental organizations in its absorption of Jewish
refugees, while wealthy, oil-rich Arab governments have relied on
the United Nations, and more specifically, the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA), to perpetuate Palestinian misery as a political weapon
against Israel. 148 Prime Minister Ben-Gurion stated in 1961 that,
"Israel did not wait until the Arab rulers should return the property
of the Jewish refugees, but, regarding them as human beings and
brothers, saw to their absorption .... The Arab rulers treated the
Arab refugees not as human beings and members of their own
people, but as a weapon with which to strike at Israel."'' 49 This
see also Freedman, supra note 93 ("Justice for Jews From Arab Countries... has
united grass-roots groups active on the issue, like the World Organization of
Jews From Arab Countries, with pillars of the Jewish establishment, like the
President's Conference. The new organization's honorary chairmen include
Richard C. Holbrooke, former American ambassador to the United Nations.").
146 See Justice for Jews from Arab Countries, supra note 145.
147 See Freedman, supra note 93 ("While the events of this exodus are decades
old, the advocacy on behalf of Jewish refugees has grown markedly in the last
several years. These efforts, ranging from briefings for members of Congress to
diplomatic maneuvers in the United Nations, seek to bring both historical
attention and financial compensation to the Jewish refugees.").
148 See id.; see also McCallin, supra note 101.
149 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ben-Gurion, supra note
123. But see Freedman, supra note 93. Professor Rashid Khalidi of Columbia
University believes that the idea of making Palestinians citizens of Arab
countries is misguided. As he claimed, "In a Zionist narrative, [Jews] should've
wanted to go to Israel in the first place. The Palestinians didn't want to leave and
weren't going back to their homeland. But some people have tried to tell Arabs
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argument holds some merit. Palestinians were either forced out of
Israel or fled during the 1948 Arab-Israel War.15 0 However, while
the Jewish refugees were readily absorbed into Israel, with full
citizenship rights, Palestinian refugees have been refused
citizenship in most Arab countries and many live in United
Nations-sponsored refugee camps throughout the Arab world.151
Whereas the world community and the United Nations have
prolonged the status of Palestinians as refugees, Israel absorbed the
other refugee group caused by the 1948 Arab-Israeli War at a great
financial cost. 152 Hence, the Government of Israel has contended
that the world community should rectify this problem as Israel
should not be alone in having to bear the burden of both Jewish
and Palestinian reparations. It has therefore conditioned a future
peace agreement on the compensation of Jewish refugees.
5 3
what their nationalism should be and have tried to tutor the Palestinians in the
proper understanding of their own national identity." Id.
50 See MORRIS supra note 25, at 258 (Many factors led to the Palestinian
exodus, including "isolation among a cluster of Jewish settlements, a feeling of
being cut off from Arab centers, a lack of direction by national leaders and a
feeling of abandonment by the Arab world, fear of Jewish assault, reports and
rumors about massacres by the Jews, and actual attacks and massacres.").
151 See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Policy on the Right of
Return: Treatment and Rights in Arab Host States, available at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/israel/return/arab-rtr.htm (last accessed Feb. 1,
2004).
Initially the response of host Arab states to the incoming Palestinian
refugees was to offer them refuge on the assumption that it would be
temporary. When it became obvious that the problem would be
protracted, the policies of Arab states toward the refugees changed, and
the initial sympathy was coupled with an insistence on Israel's ultimate
responsibility for them. As a result most Arab governments strongly
opposed resettlement and naturalization of the refugees. Instead, they
adopted policies and procedures aimed at preserving the Palestinian
identity of the individuals and their status as refugees.
Id.; see also Freedman, supra note 93. In June of 2003, the House International
Relations Committee criticized the UNRWA for its failure to permanently
resettle Palestinian refugees. See id.
152 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ben-Gurion, supra note
123.
153 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ambassador Dan
Gillerman, supra note 85.
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Nevertheless, Arab commentators and Jewish groups alike have
warned about the consequences of linking the Jewish and
Palestinian refugee situations. Professor Shibley Telhami believes
that by putting the issue of compensation on the table, Israel may
give Arab countries an edge, as they could insist on resettlement of
refugees instead of compensation. 15 4 Arab countries would accept
resettlement, as Jews would inevitably be a minority in Arab
countries and probably would never return, whereas an influx of
Palestinians into Israel would result in a demographic threat to the
Jewish nature of the state.' 55  This would force Israel to either
admit that it will not accept Palestinian refugees or accept them
and lose its Jewish character. 56 Additionally, Jewish groups are
wary that by linking the two refugee situations, the claims will
equalize, depriving both sets of refugees from the compensation
and justice that they deserve.157 While the Government of Israel
The legitimate rights of former Jewish refugees displaced from Arab
countries is an issue that has not yet been adequately addressed by the
international community. Since 1947, there have been over 681 UN
resolutions on the Middle East conflict, including 101 that refer directly
to the plight of Palestinian refugees. Not one of these resolutions even
mentions the plight of Jewish refugees, let alone calls for action to
address their suffering. If we are to address fairly the situation of the
Middle East, the plight of these Jewish refugees can no longer be
forgotten. No comprehensive Middle East peace settlement can be
reached without recognition of, and redress for, the legitimate rights
Jews displaced from Arab countries.
Id.
154 See Freedman, supra note 93.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See id. Stanley Urman, the executive director of Justice for Jews From Arab
Countries, stated that his organization's goal was to ensure that both the
Palestinian and Jewish refugees receive rights and redress. Professor Khalidi
believes that the campaign for compensation for Jewish refugees should be dealt
with by the Arab governments, rather than as a bait-and-switch with the
Palestinians, as "Oriental Jews [will then have to] pay the price for Israel's
confiscation of a very large amount of Palestinian property." Id.
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might not object to this equalization, as it would not have to pay
reparations to Palestinians, the former Minister for Social and
Diaspora Affairs, Rabbi Michael Melchior, stated that "there
would be no talk of offsetting Jewish against Palestinian claims but
rather, that every person must be compensated individually."'' 58
Nonetheless, it is still an unsettled issue as to whether Israel will
seek to offset the Palestinian and Jewish claims in the framework
of a peace plan or to advocate compensation for each individual
person, as justice would seem to require.
C. The Movement towards Remedies for the Jewish Refugees
from Arab Countries
There are several legal and political bases for the right of
the Jewish refugees to reparations. United Nations Security
Council Resolution 242, adopted in 1967, calls for "a just
settlement of the refugee problem," deliberately making no
distinction between Arab and Jewish refugees. 159 The Camp David
Accords between Egypt and Israel call for the establishment of a
claims commission for "the mutual settlement of all financial
claims."' 160 The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference established a
Multilateral Working Group whose mandate was to ensure the
status and rights of "all persons displaced as a result of the 1948
Arab-Israeli conflict."' 61 In the peace agreement between Jordan
and Israel, both parties promised to resolve the issue of refugees in
the framework of this Multilateral Working Group.'62  Finally,
158 LEVIN, supra note 57, at 234-35.
159 S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (1967); see also Basri,
supra note 18, at 713 ("Justice Arthur Goldberg, the American delegate who
was instrumental in drafting the unanimously adopted Resolution, has pointed
out that the words 'Palestinian' or 'Arab' were deliberately left out of the
Resolution to indicate that, in addition to the claims of the Palestinian refugees,
the claims of the Jewish refugees from Arab lands need also be addressed.").
160 Camp David Accords: The Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Sept.
17, 1978, Egypt-Isr., 17 I.L.M. 1463, 1469 [hereinafter Camp David Accords].
161 Justice for Jews from Arab Countries, supra note 145.
162 See Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan, 34 I.L.M. 43, 49; see also Marc Perelman,
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although it was not legally binding, President Clinton called for
compensation for both Palestinian and Jewish refugees, through
the formation of an international fund. 163 This proposal gave the
reparations movement the political force and the momentum which
it had previously lacked.
According to the Declaration of Principles of International
Law on Compensation to Refugees, "the State that turns a person
into a refugee commits an internationally wrongful act, which
creates the obligation to make good the wrong done."' 164  The
Declaration makes no distinction between obligations to
compensate a national or an alien made a refugee by State
action.165 Furthermore, a State that violates international law by
creating a refugee situation is required, as appropriate, "(a) to
discontinue the act; (b) to apply remedies provided under the
municipal law; (c) to restore the situation to that which existed
prior to the act; (d) to pay compensation in the event of the
impossibility of the restoration of the pre-existing situation; and (e)
to provide appropriate guarantees against the repetition... of the
act."1
66
Bills Introduced on Jews Displaced by 1948 War, THE FORWARD, Apr. 2, 2004,
available at http://forward.com/main/article.php?ref=perelman2004O331951.
Another target of. the lobbying efforts is the Canadian
government, which chairs a multilateral working group on
refugees set up at the 1991 Madrid conference on Middle East
peace. Although the working group has been dormant for years,
Urman claims it might spring back into action when the issue of
compensation for refugees eventually comes up in the context of a
final peace settlement.
Id.
163 See supra note 129.
164 Luke T. Lee, The Cairo Declaration Of Principles Of International Law on
Compensation To Refugees, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L 157, 158 (1993) (Declaration is
reprited).165 See id.
'66 Id. at 158-59.
2004-2005
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
D. Specific Remedies
1. Restitution
Restitution is aimed at restoring the "situation that existed
before the wrongful act was committed.' ' 167 Restitution in this
situation is unlikely for a number of reasons. First, Jewish
properties were most likely destroyed and can never be returned to
their rightful owners. Second, Arabs have settled on land that was
once owned by Jews, making their evacuation a corollary to the
introduction of Jews back onto that land. Third, in general, the
Jewish refugees do not want to return to the Arab countries that
persecuted them. Fourth, the passage of time and the old age or
death of many refugees will further inhibit restitution as there are
few people left who would be able to resettle in their native lands.
As the situation can never return to the way it was before the
Jewish exodus, restitution for the Jewish refugees is improbable.
2. Truth and Reconciliation Commission
A truth and reconciliation commission seeks to provide
justice to the victims of human rights abuses by creating a
historical account of the violations that examines the causes and
nature of the abuses.' 68 It provides a framework conducive to
admissions of guilt as it facilitates amnesty for those who make
full disclosure. 69 Commissions can make recommendations for
compensation, and victims are often entitled to pursue civil suits,
as long as they are not barred by amnesty provisions. 170 Truth
commissions can lead to public apologies, acknowledgment of past
167 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Reparations for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, 85 INT'L. REV. OF THE RED CROSS 529, 531 (2003).
168 See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1218-48 (2d ed. 2000).
169 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary
Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761, 767 (2004).
170 See STEINER, supra note 168.
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wrongdoing and the availability of some level of justice to the
victims. 171 "Victims cannot forget what has happened to them and
cannot proceed to build for the future until their calls for justice
have been answered . . . . Forgiveness cannot be considered
without knowledge and insight - and without forgiveness, there
cannot be any meaningful reconciliation.,1 72  Therefore, truth
commissions are typically used during transitions from a more
restrictive form of government to a more democratic one,
providing closure and enabling the new government to succeed
without the burdens of the past. 
73
Truth commissions are useful for a variety of reasons.
First, by focusing on broad patterns of violence, instead of
individual guilt, they can gather a more comprehensive record of
past injustices than individual trials.' 74 "[P]ublic exposure of the
truth is the only effective way of ensuring that history is recorded
more accurately and more faithfully than otherwise would have
been the case. [For example, the] Nuremberg Trials have made the
work of Holocaust deniers far more difficult."'175 Second, truth
commissions allow victims to tell their stories and may uncover
injustices otherwise silenced or denied. 176  Third, they render
justice to the victims by formally acknowledging the abuses
committed and by providing for alternative forms of
accountability, ranging from monetary reparation to the public
identification of the perpetrators. 177  Fourth, truth commissions
171 Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and
National Reconciliation: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 952, 957 (2001).
172 Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making." Truth
Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 485, 492 (1996).
173 See Stahn, supra note 171, at 954.
174 See id.
175 See Goldstone, supra note 172, at 489.
176 See Stahn, supra note 171, at 954.
177 See id.
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may have a deterrent effect, as political and military leaders realize
that they are likely to be held accountable for human rights
violations. 17
8
A truth commission regarding Jewish refugees may be
appropriate and feasible in Iraq, as it is undergoing a change from
a dictatorship to a democracy.' 79 "As potentially the first
democratic Arab country, Iraq could [also] be the first Arab
country to confront its past and reconcile with the Jews."'  Jews
and other Iraqis have suffered together as they have "shared the
common legacy of British colonialism, as well as the regime of
Saddam Hussein."' 81 A truth commission in Iraq could address the
claims of all of the groups that suffered under Iraqi dictatorships.
This process would reinforce Iraqi democracy, as even a small
amount of justice would be rendered for these historically
oppressed groups. Without some attempt at reconciliation between
Iraq's many factions, it is doubtful that a true democracy could
take hold. Hence, if and when the situation in Iraq stabilizes, it
may be in the best interests of the Iraqi Governing Council, the
United States Military, and the Iraqi people to form a truth
commission to address all of the human rights claims that the new
government is bound to receive.
However, the success of a truth commission is dependent
on context. A truth commission may be appropriate and may even
be possible for Iraq, as it is undergoing a transition in government
and may soon be the first Arab democracy. However, it is doubtful
that even Iraq or any other Arab state would agree to a truth
commission, absent Israeli willingness to employ one for the
178 See Goldstone, supra note 172, at 490.
179 See Basri, supra note 18, at 716.
'80 Id. at 718. But see Levin, supra note 103, at 12.
The downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq has revived hopes
that the new regime will compensate Iraqi Jews for their lost property,
although it seems that these hopes will not be realized any time soon. It
will take several years for the new regime to stabilize and Jewish
claims do not top the priorities of the new Iraq.
Id.
181 Basri, supra note 18, at 718.
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Palestinian refugees.' 82  Hence, for a comprehensive truth
commission to be realized, it would have to be formed pursuant to
a Middle East peace treaty between Israel and all of its
neighbors. 183 Yet, it should still be stressed that while a regional
peace plan may be necessary to form a truth commission,
recognition of the rights of both Palestinian and Jewish refugees,
through a truth commission or any other form, is needed to
legitimize the peace agreement under international law and world
opinion.
3. Litigation
Litigating claims in national courts against the Arab
countries or individuals responsible for the confiscation of Jewish
property would likely be unsuccessful. While the courts of
different countries have considered claims by victims of human
rights abuses, only a small amount of such claims have been
successful. 84 In general, there have been three grounds for the
failure of these claims: (1) a peace settlement precluded lawsuits;
(2) sovereign immunity protected States from scrutiny by national
courts; or (3) the right to reparations was non-self-executing, as
international law did not give individuals standing to bring such
suits before domestic courts. 185 Other challenges, including time
limitations and the enforcement of judgments, have precluded
182 In February 2004, the Iraqi Council rejected the return of Iraqi Jews, although
this decision is not binding, as the chief American administrator, Paul Bremer,
did not sign it into law. See Filkins, supra note 87 ("'My feeling is, as long as
the Palestinian problem exists, as long as there is a state of war, then we should
not allow the Jews to return,' said Muhammad Bahaddin Saladin, a member of
the Governing Council. 'The minister of defense in Israel is an Iraqi Jew. Should
we let him return?').
183See infra Section 3 (analyzing barriers to peace in the Middle East).
184 See Gillard, supra note 167, at 537.
185 See id.
2004:-2005
194 Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXIII
successful litigation in domestic courts.' 
86
In the United States, victims of human rights violations
abroad have used the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) to bypass
traditional notions of sovereign immunity and sue their oppressors.
The ATCA states that "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."' 87  In the landmark case of Fildrtiga v. Pena-
Irala,188 the Court of Appeals held that state-sanctioned torture was
within the purview of the ATCA.' 89  Congress later passed the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 9° giving
American courts jurisdiction over civil suits concerning torture or
extrajudicial killing committed abroad. 191
Both the ATCA and the TVPA have been used to litigate
claims of foreign human rights abuses, but the Bush
"administration has ... made it clear that it opposes much of the
Fildrtiga-based case law in favour of plaintiffs."' 192 Furthermore,
186 See id. at 539.
187 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
188 Fildrtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
"9 Id. at 880, 884-85.
190 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
191 Id.
192 j. Romesh Weeramantry, Time Limitation Under the United States Alien Tort
Claims Act, 85 INT'L. REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 627, 629 (2003). In fact, in
2004, the Supreme Court heard the Sosa v. 41varez-Machain case on whether
the Alien Tort Claims Act allows foreign citizens to use the federal courts to sue
for damages for human rights violations committed overseas. 124 S.Ct. 2739
(2004). The United States argued:
[T]he law itself created no rights that could be invoked by private
parties but simply provided jurisdiction over a limited category of
cases. [It] said that private human rights suits - some relying on
treaties or international agreements that the United States has not
signed - threatened the separation of powers by injecting the
federal courts into the business of articulating the country's
foreign policy.
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Case about Foreigners' Use of Federal
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at A16. The Supreme Court ended up
ruling that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear cases by foreigners who claim
to be victims of human rights violations outside the United States, yet the Court
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although the ATCA does not contain a limitations-period, "case
law demonstrates that United States courts have not entertained
seriously a view that any claim under the ATCA is free from a
limitations period."' 93  Because of the similarity between the
ATCA and the TVPA and because of the need to limit claims out
of practical necessity, courts have used the TVPA's ten-year
limitations period and have applied it to ATCA claims.' 94 Hence,
plaintiffs suing under both the ATCA and TVPA have a ten-year
window of opportunity to file their claims.' 95 After this ten-year
period is over, claims filed under the TVPA will be denied and
claims filed pursuant to the ATCA will continue only by the
discretion of the court.1
96
Any suit commenced in a United States court on behalf of
the former Jewish refugees against the Arab countries would
probably fail if limited to a ten-year statute of limitations. As there
were almost no Jews left in the Arab world ten years ago and most
of the human rights violations occurred prior to the 1970s, the
statute of limitations to file claims under either the ATCA or
TVPA has passed. Furthermore, the courts are unlikely to waive
this limitation as the Bush administration has strongly advocated
for a restrictive approach to the ATCA. 197 Therefore, lawsuits in
United States courts will probably be ineffective in compensating
former Jewish refugees.
While international law imposes no statute of limitations
for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity,'
98
left many questions unanswered and never addressed the issue of the statute of
limitations of the ATCA. See Linda Greenhouse, Human Rights Abuses
Worldwide Are Held to Fall Under U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at
A21.
193Weeramantry, supra note 192, at 632.
194 See id. at 631.
'9' See id. at 635.
196 See id.
197 See id.
'9' See id. at 632.
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litigation in an international court may be unsuccessful as well.
First, many internationally-sanctioned remedies are not available to
Jewish refugees because the historical account of their suffering
has been unexplored. 199 Also, since there were over 800,000
refugees, each with a potential claim, individual suits in an
international court would overwhelm an international court.
200
Instead of justice for all or most of the Jews from the Arab world,
there would be justice for only the few Jews who might qualify to
have their claims heard by an international court. Finally, it would
be unlikely, even if a suit was successful, that an Arab government
would pay outside of a political settlement with Israel. Such a
country would likely suffer harsh political backlash from its own
people and from other Arab nations.201 Consequently,
compensation and recognition of suffering may not be available in
the international court system either.
4. Insurance
In 2003, while processing 12,000 files on property and
assets held by Jews in Arab countries, the Israel Justice Ministry's
Department for the Rights of Jews from Arab Countries found 200
cases of Iraqi Jews whose insurance policies were never honored
because they were expelled from that country.202 In April 2004, it
was announced that three of these Jews who were forced out of
their homes and lost their property will be paid $130,000 by Axa, a
French insurance company.2°3 Four more Iraqi Jews that took out
insurance plans with the company are eligible for compensation as
199 See Basri, supra note 18, at 715.
200 See Liesbeth Zegveld, Remedies for Victims of Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, 85 INTL. REV. OF THE RED CRoss, 497, 522 (2003).
201 See Levin, supra note 103, at 12 ("[I]t seems that partial compensation for
Jews from Arab countries can only be achieved within the framework of a
comprehensive agreement in the Middle East.").
202 See Shlomo Shamir, Insurance Firm to Pay Jews who Fled Iraq in 1950s,
HA'ARETZ, Apr. 20, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/
41722 l.html (copy on file with.the author).
203 See id.
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well.2 °4 This marks the first time that Jews who were expelled
from Arab countries received compensation.2 °5
While this development is promising for the Jewish
refugees, several important limitations exist on the eligibility for
compensation from insurance plans. First, in the case of the Iraqi
Jews mentioned above, it is likely that they had to have been Iraqi
citizens when they purchased the insurance policies.20 6 Therefore,
Jews who were stripped of their citizenship before they bought
insurance may not be covered. Second, insurance payments are
applicable only to those Jews who bought an insurance policy.
Hence, not every Jew would be covered and not every asset would
be covered, which would deny payment to many Jews. Third, not
every insurance policy is on record with the Israeli government;
only 200 were found. Moreover, not every Jew has a record of lost
property or lost assets. Hence, lack of documentation may bar
payment as well. Finally, many insurance companies may simply
be unwilling to compensate former Jewish refugees.
While insurance payments are positive developments, they
cannot and will not provide compensation to the thousands of other
displaced Jews who do not qualify for insurance proceeds. On the
other hand, those Jews who actually receive insurance proceeds
will be denied the justice of receiving apologies from the Arab
world. Instead, no one is held responsible for the atrocities
committed and the Arab governments can escape liability by
asserting that these Jews were already compensated by insurance
companies. Nevertheless, the insurance payments made to the
three Iraqi Jews may open the door for other Jews from other
countries to examine the issue and file claims of their own with
their respective insurance providers. Insurance payments hold a
degree of merit as a means of compensation, since insufficient
compensation is still better than no compensation.
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See id.
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5. Claims Commissions and Compensation Funds
A recent trend in international law has been the
establishment of claims commissions, which provide remedies
from victims of human rights abuses. 20 7 Two examples of such
commissions are (1) the United Nations Compensation
Commission, established in 1991 by the Security Council to
determine Iraq's liability to the Kuwaiti government, citizens, and
corporations, and (2) the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
(EECC), established pursuant to the 2000 peace agreement to settle
claims for loss, damage and injury.20 8 The EECC has been
particularly successful, as over 400,000 claims have been filed by
Ethiopian and Eritrean individuals in the last few years.20 9 Such
mass-claim commissions "are the most appropriate for victims of
mass crimes committed in settings where it is difficult to resolve
claims on a case-by-case basis and where usually limited resources
are available." 210 Generally, these commissions provide for either
a return of property or financial compensation.
2 1
A claims commission, established pursuant to a regional
peace agreement, is the best hope for monetary compensation for
the former Jewish refugees. Under President Clinton's proposed
peace plan, the international community, including the United
States, the European Union, Israel, the Arab countries, and Japan,
would set up a fund, administered and supervised by the claims
212commission. The commission would ensure the objective
distribution of funds to both Palestinian and Jewish claimants, as
neither Arab governments nor a pro-Israeli American government
would control the process. The establishment of an international
fund would also reduce the burden of any one State. Unlike
lawsuits, a commission can ensure that all of the refugees receive
207 See Zegveld, supra note 200, at 521; see generally Gillard, supra note 167, at
540-45 (discussing claims commissions).
208 See Zegveld, supra note 200, at 521.
209 See id. at 522.
2 10 
id.
211 Id.
212 See supra note 129; see also Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 45, at 339-40;
Levin, supra note 103, at 12.
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compensation. Finally, a mass-claim commission would work well
in this situation as resolving claims on a case-by-case basis would
be difficult due to a number of factors, including, but not limited
to: (1) the time lapse between the exodus of both sets of refugees
and the present, (2) loss or lack of sufficient documentation of
confiscated property, and (3) the old age or death of many of the
refugees.
Palestinians have feared that compensation to Jews may
offset their own legitimate claims.21 3 Palestinians often demand
that compensation to Jewish claimants be the responsibility of the
Arab states that caused their exodus. 2 14 The establishment of an
international fund, pursuant to a Middle East multilateral peace
treaty should allay these fears. Palestinians could be compensated
regardless of what happens to the Jewish claimants. This would
serve to depoliticize the issue, as both parties would be
compensated, and it may also lessen the tendency to assert that one
claim is more valid than the other.
Of course, the major obstacle towards the establishment of
a claims commission and the compensation of Jewish refugees is
the issue of Middle East peace. Without a comprehensive peace
agreement, Arab governments that are officially at war with Israel
will have little incentive to compensate Israel's Jewish citizens.
Furthermore, the Arab world may not have the popular support to
negotiate compensation for refugees while Israel and the
Palestinians are still engaged in conflict. For its part, Israel will
have no reason to compensate Palestinian refugees without getting
security and a peace agreement in return. Therefore, until there is
a regional treaty, establishing peaceful relations between Israel and
the whole Arab world (including the Palestinians), it is unlikely
that either group of refugees will be compensated. As it is
213 See Freedman, supra note 93. Palestinian Professor Khalidi believes that the
claims of the Jewish refugees should be addressed by the Arab states and should
not be part of a "bait-and-switch" tactic. See id.
214 See id.
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doubtful that such a peace treaty will be signed in the near future, it
is equally doubtful that Jewish or Palestinian refugees will receive
compensation from a claims commission in the foreseeable future.
SECTION III: BARRIERS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
TO REGIONAL PEACE
A. Conditions for a Regional Peace Agreement
As explained in the previous section, a claims commission
is the best hope for reparations for both Palestinian and Jewish
refugees. Such a commission, under international supervision, has
the potential to recognize injustice and serve as an adequate system
of compensating refugees for past harm. The commission may not
end all the memories of oppression and violence, but it could end
the claims of injustice. With the end of such claims, a true peace
may be possible as long-harbored animosities and resentments will
be recognized and managed. However, in order for the claims
commission to be formed, there must be a regional Middle East
peace agreement. Without the participation of all of the states and
parties involved in causing the refugee issue, the commission
cannot serve its dual purposes of recognizing guilt and
compensating victims. Since there is little incentive for Israel or
the Arab world to form a claims commission absent a regional
peace agreement, it seems that a regional peace agreement is a
prerequisite to the commission's formation. This leads to the final,
and perhaps most unanswerable, question in this Comment: how
can there be peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, when
they have been in a state of war for more than half a century?
A regional peace agreement in the Middle East is
conditioned on a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.
Without a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, Arab states
may not have the legitimacy or mandate to negotiate a peace
agreement, as their citizens will refuse a normalization of relations
while their fellow Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza are still in a
conflict with Israel. For example, in 1994, Jordan entered into a
peace agreement with Israel only after peace between Israel and
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the Palestinians seemed all but assured.215 The silent Arab
majority's acceptance of peace between Israel and the Palestinians
"empowered Jordan's King Hussein, one of the greatest fence-
sitters of all time, to get off the fence and sign his own peace treaty
with Israel on October 26, 1994.''216 Likewise, the 2002 Arab
Peace Initiative, which was spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, stated
that the Arab world will consider the conflict over, will enter into a
peace agreement with Israel, and will normalize relations with
Israel, if Israel would withdraw to pre-1967 boundaries, if there
was a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, and if there
would be the formation of an independent Palestine in the West
Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital.217 Similarly,
President Bush's 2003 "Road Map to Peace" called for "Arab state
acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all
the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-
Israeli peace" once a permanent agreement to the Palestinian-
218Israeli conflict was established. Unless a leader emerges and
makes an overture for peace with Israel, as was the case with
Anwar Sadat of Egypt, or conditions, such as war and
democratization, change the facts on the ground, it is unlikely that
there will be a regional peace agreement without a resolution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
2 19
However, peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition to regional peace. Issues
such as state-sponsored terrorism, globalization, nuclear
215 See MORRIS, supra note 25, at 629.
216 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM 557 (1995).
217 See Mideast Web, The Arab Peace Initiative (Mar. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.mideastweb.org/saudipeace.htm (last accessed Mar. 29, 2005).
218 The U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: A Performance-Based
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
(Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm.
219 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 512 ("History teaches us that in the Middle
East, only overwhelming pain or pleasure - only war or a Sadat-like overture -
will really make the parties ready to get pregnant.").
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•disarmament, the Golan Heights, water uses, the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism, incitement and public perception are all barriers
to a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and its Arab
neighbors. If and when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ceases,
these issues must be dealt with in order for a regional peace to take
hold.
B. Barriers to an Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement and
Possible Solutions
The causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are well
known. They include, but are not limited to, British colonialism,
Zionism, Pan-Arabism, war, terrorism, settlements, and religious
extremism. Yet, solving this conflict is a more complicated matter.
There are many obstacles and impediments to an Israeli-Palestinian
peace agreement. Some of them include: (1) mutual claims of
rights and injustice, (2) the intertwining of the populations, (3)
religious extremism and terrorism, and (4) a lack of effective
leadership. Any agreement must recognize these issues, as well as
others, and overcome them for peace to be possible.
i. Mutual Claims of Rights and Injustice
Both Israelis and the Palestinians claim that they have
certain rights to the land between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean Sea. Palestinians have claimed that they have a
right to return to land they left, either voluntarily or involuntarily,
following the 1948 War. Palestinians also claim that they have a
right to have a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Other
Palestinians, most notably those associated with Hamas and other
terrorist organizations, claim that all of the land between the
Jordan River and the Mediterranean, meaning both Israel and the
territories, is Muslim land. Israel, on the other hand, has argued
that it has a right to a Jewish state with Jerusalem as its capital.
Israel has claimed that it has a right to the Golan Heights, the West
Bank and Gaza, as it captured those lands from the Syrian,
Jordanian, and Egyptian armies, respectively, in the 1967 War. It
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has maintained over the years, that the land captured from the 1967
War is important for security and strategic reasons as well, as a
buffer from future invasions, as a way to gather intelligence of
activities in Palestinian cities, and as a bargaining chip for future
peace. Furthermore, Israel's religious settler movement claims that
it has a right to the West Bank, as those were lands that God gave
the Jews in biblical times.
The Israelis and Palestinians use instances of historical
injustice to justify their claims. The Palestinians cite examples of
how they were expelled from their homes in 1948 as a basis for
their "right of return." Israel, however, has contended that many
Palestinians voluntarily left their homes, so as to facilitate the Arab
invasion of Israel. Israel has also argued that the Palestinian right
of return would nullify the right to have a Jewish state in the land
of Israel, as the resulting demographics in Israel from the right of
return would favor Palestinians, and not Jews. While these claims
may be legitimate, the problem with them is that they are often
competing claims, leaving little room for compromise. As author
and New York Times Foreign Affairs columnist, Thomas Friedman,
wrote:
Because of [the] overlapping historical claims, it is
much more difficult for Israelis and Palestinians [than
the Israelis and Egyptians] to recognize each other's
basic rights in Palestine without feeling that they are
undermining their own historical positions. Imagine
how difficult it would have been to solve the problems
of Europe if there had been no Berlin and no Paris, but
just Germans and Frenchman each claiming Paris as
their rightful capital. 220
As long as the debate focuses on these historical claims and rights,
peace is unlikely. If Israel and the Palestinians claim the same land
220 FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 523.
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for what each side feels is a moral and just reason, there is little
room for compromise.
Present day interests and realities must prevail over
historical claims and rights. "As long as any party to the Arab-
Israeli conflict is focused entirely on obtaining historical or God-
given 'rights,' as he sees them, he is not going to be able to make
decisions exclusively on the basis of interests."22' In this sense,
the Palestinians must give up their "right of return," because that is
a claim that is incompatible with the recognition of Israel as a
Jewish state - a precondition to any peace deal with the Israelis.
Similarly, in a peace deal with the Palestinians, the Israelis must
give up their claim of an expansive Jewish state, encompassing the
entire West Bank. While settlements near Israel proper may be
acceptable if there is a proportional land swap with the Palestinians
(along the lines of the 2000 Camp David proposal), a claim to all
of the territories ignores the reality that millions of Palestinians
live there and that such a claim is anathema to the idea of a
Palestinian state on that very land.
Recently, Israel has moved in positive ways to differentiate
between its rights and its interests. In 2000, Prime Minister Ehud
Barak proposed at the Camp David peace talks, that in return for a
peace agreement, Israel was open to the idea of dividing its capital,
Jerusalem, in two, with East Jerusalem becoming capital of the
Palestinian state.222 In effect, Barak's proposal recognized that
Israel's interest in peace and security outweighed its right to East
Jerusalem. Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat did not come to the
same conclusion, as he rejected the peace plan, failed to propose a
counter-offer and placed Palestinian rights ahead of Palestinian
interests (namely, statehood). 23
221 Id. at 521.
222 See Mideast Web, The Israeli Camp David 2 Proposals for Final Settlement
(July 2000), available at http://www.mideastweb.org/campdavid2.htm (last
accessed Mar. 29, 2005).
223 See Gary C. Gambill, The Peace Process After Camp David, 2 MIDDLE EAST
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 7 (Aug. 5, 2000), available at http://www.meib.org/
articles/0008_mel.htm (last accessed Mar. 26, 2005).
Prior to the summit, Israel had long insisted that no part of Jerusalem
would be conceded to Arafat, while holding out the possibility of
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In 2004, Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, announced
that in recognition of the stagnation in the peace process and to
minimize the military and economic burden of the occupation, he
plans on withdrawing the Israeli presence from the Gaza Strip.
224
This includes evacuating settlers and redeploying its military
outside of the Gaza Strip.2 25 The decision was even more potent,
as it was made by Ariel Sharon as leader of the Likud party, which
has historically argued for the idea of a "Greater Israel."
Apparently, Prime Minister Sharon concluded that Israel's interest
in separation outweighed its claim to settle Gaza.
Once the debate shifts from rights to interests, from what a
party wants or feels it deserves to what a party needs, progress in
the current conflict may be made. Any peace agreement will
inevitably deal with the interests of the Israelis and the
Palestinians. However, the rights of those parties can be
recognized, even if they are not realized, in the context of the
refugee claims commission. The claims commission may
acknowledge the suffering and injustice of both sets of refugees
and in this way recognize the legitimate claims of each. This
yielding control of several predominantly Palestinian suburbs. In the
face of Arafat's recalcitrance, Barak crossed the Rubicon with a
proposal that would grant the PA 1) full sovereignty over several Arab
neighborhoods on the outskirts of Jerusalem (Beit Hanina, Kalandia,
and Shuafat, according to Israeli press reports); civilian and
administrative autonomy over Palestinian districts inside the Old City,
including the Muslim and Christian quarters, and 3) symbolic
sovereignty over the Dome of the Rock and the right to display the
Palestinian flag. The Israelis also offered unprecedented concessions
regarding the fate of Palestinian refugees. Despite the unprecedented
scope of these concessions, Arafat rejected the offer, even after it was
repackaged as an American 'bridging proposal.'
Id.224See The Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, HA'ARETZ,
available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo = 4 16024
(last accessed Mar. 26, 2005).
225 See id.
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framework would relieve the parties from the burden of claims of
rights and allow them to deal only with interests, thereby making
room for compromise and progress in any future negotiations.
ii. The Intertwining of the Populations
There is no natural geographic line separating the Israelis
from the Palestinians. This creates a multitude of problems. For
example, prior to the construction of the separation barrier in 2003-
2005, Palestinian terrorists from the West Bank easily infiltrated
into Israel. Years of terrorism, incitement and fear spurred Israelis
to dream of separating from the Palestinians, rather than of living
with them. 226 The territories were no longer a source of security
from Arab invasions, but a source of insecurity, in the form of
terrorism. 227 Rather than trying to coexist with the Palestinians,
Israelis have come to the opposite conclusion - existing without
the Palestinians. The Palestinians, meanwhile, feel that the growth
of the settlements leaves little in the way of a viable and
contiguous state and thereby favor separation as well. In a sense,
Israel and the Palestinians are not just neighbors who hate each
other - they are enemies living in the same house. Any peace plan
must recognize this intertwining of the populations and find a way
to separate them.
Many, presently unanswered, questions exist regarding the
expectations of the parties involved, the separation of the
populations and the probability of a meaningful peace. For
example, will a Palestinian state be viable if it is not contiguous
and is surrounded by Israeli land and settlements? Will
Palestinians be prepared to accept a land swap along the lines of
Prime Minister Barak's Camp David proposal, whereby Israel
would keep some settlements and exchange a proportional amount
of land in other areas to the Palestinians? Will Palestinians accept
226 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 544.
227 See id. Furthermore, the Iraqi Scud missile attack on Tel Aviv during the
Persian Gulf War diminished the strategic importance of having the West Bank
act as a buffer from attack. While Iraq may not have been able to hurt Israel with
its tanks, it could reach it with its missiles. See id. at 544-45.
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a demilitarized state to assuage Israeli fears of an army invading
from such a close range? Will an Israeli state be secure if there is a
land bridge connecting the West Bank to Gaza, if it must give up
the settlements, if it must remove its military presence in the
territories, and if the Palestinians get their own state? Will Israel
be prepared to remove the settlers, who many in Israel view with
affinity, while many others view with contempt? How will Israeli
politicians deal with the backlash from its citizens after images are
aired of Israeli soldiers forcing Israeli Jews from their homes near
holy cities like Hebron?
Two recent actions taken by Israel highlight the problem of
intertwining populations and exhibit unilateral remedies by Israel
to relieve itself of the burden of the occupation and to protect itself
and its citizens from terrorist attacks. First, Israel recently began
construction of a barrier, separating Israel proper and many of its
settlements from the Palestinian territories. 278  In protecting its
settlements, Israel has strayed from the "Green Line," the armistice
line following the 1967 war that delineates the internationally
recognized boundaries of Israel.229 Israel's motivation for the
barrier has been to quell the tide of suicide bombers and other
terrorists that come from the West Bank and attack both Israel and
its settlements.23 ° Its justification stems from the fact that almost
every suicide bomber in the last few years has come from the West
Bank, but not from Gaza, which has a fence.23' However,
Palestinians have complained that the fence's route inside the
Green Line is a "land grab," used by Israel to establish its presence
228 Tali Nir, Palestinians Charge that Separation Fence is for Land Annexation,
Not Security, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 24, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=397486.229 See id.
230 See id.
231 See Bradley Burston, Background/Fence Divides Israel and U.S., Israeli and
Israeli, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 17, 2003, available at http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=341412.
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on land that was taken from Palestinians. Some Israelis have
complained that the circuitous route of the barrier diminishes its
security benefits and ironically will not result in a true separation,
as some Palestinian villages are left on the Israeli side and some
Israeli settlements are left on the Palestinian side.
233
The second unilateral action is Ariel Sharon's plan to
disengage from the Gaza Strip. Under the disengagement plan,
Israel is expected to withdraw its military and settler presence from
Gaza by the end of 2005. In an April 2004 letter to President
Bush, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon laid out the reasons for
withdrawing from Gaza:
Having reached the conclusion that, for the time being,
there exists no Palestinian partner with whom to
advance peacefully toward a settlement and since the
current impasse is unhelpful to the achievement of our
shared goals, I have decided to initiate a process of
gradual disengagement with the hope of reducing
friction between Israelis and Palestinians. The
Disengagement Plan is designed to improve security
for Israel and stabilize our political and economic
situation. It will enable us to deploy our forces more
effectively until such time that conditions in the
Palestinian Authority allow for the full implementation
of the roadmap to resume.234
Hence, in recognition of (1) the untenable mixture of the
populations, (2) the stagnation of the peace process, (3) the
constant criticism of Israel over the occupation, and (4) the
232 See Nir, supra note 228.
233 See Burston, supra note 231. A recent study by the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy found that less than one percent of the West Bank Palestinian
population would be on the Israeli side of the barrier and roughly a quarter of
Israeli settlers would be on the Palestinian side. See David Brooks, Finally
Good News in Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A17.
234 Letter from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to President George W Bush,
HA'ARETZ, Apr. 14, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=415475.
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economic and military burden of Israel's presence in Gaza, Prime
Minister Sharon decided that it is in Israel's best interest to
withdraw. 235 Whereas the separation of the populations and the
reduction of the Israeli presence in the territories may help the
peace process, skeptics have argued that the disengagement plan
may leave a power vacuum, whereby the terrorist group Hamas
will fill the leadership void. In such a situation, Gaza would be
further radicalized and a peaceful resolution of the conflict would
236be less likely to happen. Another criticism of Israel is that since
Israel has said that it does not want to negotiate its withdrawal
from Gaza, there is no concomitant Palestinian obligation to refrain
from terrorism. A unilateral withdrawal may improve Israel's
image237 and may reduce its financial and military burden, but
235 Another reason for the disengagement plan is to keep those settlements that
Prime Minister Sharon is reluctant to give up, namely the West Bank
settlements. "In giving up Gaza, which most Israelis do not want, Mr. Sharon
wants to keep as much of the West Bank as he can, with a peace agreement if
possible, without if necessary." James Bennet, Sharon Throws Everyone Off
Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004. § 4 (Week in Review), at 5.
236 See Barry Rubin, The Region: Into a New Era, THE JERUSALEM POST, Apr.
19, 2004, available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/
JPArticle/ShowFull&cid= 1082345145726&p = 1006953079865.
[T]here will be lots of anarchy, crime, and violence. Some Fatah
nationalists will fight Hamas for control; others may align with it.
What kind of order, if any, will emerge, and what will be the
wider political consequences of that outcome? Will Gaza become
a base for heightened attacks on Israel with better weapons and
will they be stopped at the border? Supposedly, the lack of an
Israeli occupation or settlements will lead to a reduction of
tensions, but more likely the area will become a safer haven and
base for terrorists, a playground for Hizbullah and al-Qaida as
well.
Id.
237 See Bennet, supra note 235 ("In making the case for the Gaza withdrawal,
Mr. Sharon argues that it will shield Israel from international blame for the
conditions of the 1.3 million Palestinians who live there."). With the recent
death of Yasser Arafat, however, Israel has hinted that it may want to negotiate a
Gaza withdrawal.
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there is no guarantee of security or even peace. Furthermore, it is
questionable whether Ariel Sharon will even carry out this plan as
members of his own party are against it and the settler movement
holds considerable political power in Israel. Nevertheless, the
disengagement plan has the potential to be a positive development
in the conflict, as it addresses and attempts to solve the
intertwining of the populations in Gaza, the resulting tensions, and
the stalled peace process.
It has often been said that Israel can be either a Jewish state
and democratic, a Jewish state in Israel and the territories, or a
democratic state in all of the land. It cannot be a Jewish and
democratic state in all of the land. If Israel wants to be a
democratic state in all of the land, it must view every citizen
equally, whether it is a Jew or an Arab. Yet, this would be
undemocratic and unfair to the Palestinians, if that state were to
have a Jewish character. But, if Israel ignores their concerns and
wants to include the Palestinian territories in the boundaries of its
Jewish state, then it would cease to become democratic, and
thereby defy the socialist ideals of Zionism. The other alternative
for Israel is to have a Jewish and democratic state, but not in all the
land, thereby relinquishing its claim to the entire West Bank or
Gaza. This option, which is the basis of the two-state solution,
recognizes the problems inherent in the demography of the region,
namely the mixture and proximity of the populations. In short,
Israel can only maintain its Jewish and democratic identity if it
separates itself from the territories.
On the Palestinian side, the insistence of the "right of
return" to former homes, lands, and towns in Israel is a virtual non-
starter in peace negotiations with Israel. The influx of thousands
and possibly millions of Palestinians would change the
demographic nature of Israel, threatening its character as a Jewish
state. 238 Undoubtedly, the result of the right of return would be to
238 In recognition of this, President Bush rejected the right of return in April
2004. Steven R. Weisman, Jordanian King Puts Off Meeting Bush Over Israel,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at Al ("After his meeting with Mr. Sharon a week
ago, Mr. Bush broke with American policy and supported Israel's ultimate
retention of some settlements in the West Bank and also rejected the longtime
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create more integration among the populations. If the only way to
decrease the tension is to separate the populations and form two
states for two peoples, then the right of return would do just the
opposite. It would create a Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Gaza and it would change Israel's identity as a Jewish state, once a
critical mass of Palestinians moved there. One compromise that
has been proposed is for Israel to agree in principle to the right of
return, compensate Palestinians, and admit a nominal amount of
Palestinians to settle in its boundaries. 239 This would serve to
recognize the injustice done to the Palestinians, yet would not
undermine the concept of a two-state solution and the Jewish
character of Israel.
Regardless of the parameters and the specifics of a peace
deal, any agreement that is founded on the notion of a two-state
solution will recognize the necessity of separating the populations.
With the dispute centering on such a small piece of land, both the
Israelis and the Palestinians need a space that they can call their
own. The Israelis need to feel secure, unthreatened by their
neighbors, while the Palestinians need a space free from Israeli
intervention in order to realize their goal of independence. Both
sides must compromise, with Israel removing some settlements
and ending the occupation and the Palestinians recognizing Israel's
right to exist, refraining from terrorism, and relinquishing their
claim to a "right of return." However, the forces that oppose such
a compromise, namely religious extremists, terrorists, and inept
leaders, are vocal, powerful and numerous in the region.
Compromise can only be realized by overcoming these groups.
Palestinian demand for a right of return to family homes abandoned in 1948 in
what is now Israel.").
239 In the unofficial, nonbinding Geneva Accords, such a compromise was
proposed. See The Geneva Initiative, The Geneva Accords, available at
http://www.heskem.org.il/Heskem-en.asp (last accessed Mar. 29, 2005).
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iii. Religious Extremism, Incitement and Terrorism
Religious extremism and terrorism is not just a problem
within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is a
problem that threatens the stability of the whole Middle East in
ways ranging from peace with Israel to the legitimacy of the Arab
monarchies. As such, the problem of religious extremism is a
major obstacle to the end of terrorism, the Arab world's integration
into the 2 1 st century, and improved relations between East and
West.
Islamic fundamentalism is a socioeconomic phenomenon
with its roots in "unemployment, corruption, disparities in wealth,
and brutality of government." 240  As Thomas Friedman writes,
"[w]hen people in these traditional Arab societies find themselves
with scant economic opportunities and traditional mores
challenged by a tidal wave of Westernization, they naturally fall
back on the political language of protest they know best, which is
Islam.",241 Incapable of directing their anger towards their own
oppressive governments, Islamic extremists blame Israel, the
United States and the West for their condition. Arab governments,
in turn, have encouraged this view as a way to deflect attention
from their own corruption and flawed policies and onto their
enemy, Israel. However, such extremism is not only a threat to
Israel and the West, but to moderate Arab or Islamic countries that
want to either democratize, Westernize or make peace.242 Recent
al-Qaeda suicide attacks in the moderate, yet predominantly
Muslim, state of Turkey 243 and the pro-American Kingdom of
240 FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 548.
241 Id.
242 See id.
243 In Istanbul in November 2003, "[t]wo trucks packed with homemade
explosives detonated outside the synagogues, killing six Jews and 19 Muslims,
including the two bombers." Turkey Names Suicide Bombers, CNN, Nov. 19,
2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/I 1/19/
turkey.explosion/. "The attacks appeared [to be] aimed at disrupting the pro-
Western secular axis many people in the Middle East believe the United States
and Britain are trying to drive through the region with Iraq war." Craig S.
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Saudi Arabia have highlighted this problem.244 The goals of these
extremists are to rid the Arab world of Western influence, to
destroy Israel and to spread their version of Islam throughout the
region.245 Their methods, often manifested as incitement or
terrorism, seek to polarize the region into Muslims and non-
Muslims, East and West.246 Islamic fundamentalism's real danger
is in this dual threat to both the West (Israel, Europe and the
United States) and the moderate Arab and Islamic regimes.
Religious extremism in the Middle East has resulted in a
widespread view that coexistence with Israel is impossible and
only terrorism and a war of attrition can make Israel relent. Iranian
and Syrian-backed terrorist group Hezbollah, (or "Army of God"
in English) fully engages in such a propaganda war with its
Lebanese-based television station Al Manar. The station, which
has been heavily criticized by the United States, Europe and Israel,
produces the following television shows:
The program "Terrorists" . . . plays endless loops of
film from Israeli attacks that killed civilians. "Sincere
Smith, A Region Inflamed: Terrorism; In the Balance: Attacks on Turkey Try to
Sever a Bridge Between Islam and West, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003, at Al0.
244 See Neil MacFarquhar, Four Killed and 148 Wounded in Suicide Bombing in
Riyadh, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, at Al; see also Neil MacFarquhar, Police
Building in Saudi Capital is Wrecked by Car Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004,
at Al.
245 With the case of the Turkey bombings, the goals of such extremists were
present: (1) Turkey, as the only Muslim member of NATO, as an applicant to
the European Union, and as a military and economic friend of Israel, was seen
by the terrorists as too close to the West; (2) the terrorists wanted to make the
EU wary of admitting Turkey, thereby driving a wage between the two; (3) the
terrorists chose to attack synagogues, which was in effect, an attack on the
'Jewish people and hence, the Jewish state; and (4) the growing generation of
disenfranchised youth in Turkey have turned towards conservative Islam,
thereby threatening the moderate and secular country of Turkey. See Smith,
S pra note 243.24se id.
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Men," drawing its name from a Koranic verse about
the strength of the faithful when facing battle, profiles
either Hezbollah fighters who undertook suicide
missions or those in waiting. "The Mission" follows a
standard game show format... One senior United
States official in the region ... grumble[d] about "The
Mission" as encouraging violence, calling it "Name
Your Favorite Terrorist." 247
Throughout the Arab world, the media portrays Jews negatively,
whether it is in school textbooks, magazines, or newspapers.
Recently, Abu Dhabi Television used the blood libel to portray
Ariel Sharon as drinking the blood of Arabs, 248 while Egyptian
television aired a 30-part series, Horseman without a Horse, based
on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a forged document
purporting to prove a Jewish plan to control the world.249 Such
anti-Semitic and anti-Israel propaganda serves only to embitter the
Arab world and place both Israel and the Jewish people as enemies
of Islam. This propaganda and incitement endangers any prospects
for peace and must be dealt with by the Arab world if there is to be
any reconciliation with Israel and the Jewish people.
Too often, the result of propaganda and religious
extremism is terrorism. While Islamic terrorism has many roots
(e.g., socioeconomics, culture, Westernization, Israeli occupation),
religious extremism may be its strongest cause. Terror
organizations, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda, use
religion as a recruiting tool, as motivation for their attacks and as
an excuse for their legitimacy. In doing so, they hurt both the
victims of their attacks and Islam in general, for they are acting in
247 Neil MacFarquhar, On Gameshow, Arab Drumbeat: Remember Jerusalem,
N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2004, at A3.
248 Press Release, Anti-Defamation League, ADL Outraged at Anti-Semitic
Blood Libel Skits on Arab Television, (Nov. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.adl.org/presrele/Aslnt_13/3964_13.asp (last accessed Mar. 26,
2005).
249 See Egypt Criticized for Anti-Semitic Film, BBC NEWS, Nov. 1, 2002,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middle-east/2386767.stm (last
accessed Mar. 26, 2005).
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Islam's name. In contrast to some groups which used terror attacks
for political goals, fundamentalists use such attacks to achieve
religious goals as well. Because of their unflinching and
unwavering devotion to their religion and their consequent
commitment to destroy Israel, compromise is impossible with
fundamentalists and therefore, they pose a severe threat to the
peace process. With one bombing, a terrorist can destroy
negotiations and throw the region into a tailspin. It is this power in
the hands of a few terrorists that poses the greatest threat to peace
in the Middle East.
The power to destroy the peace process has been wielded
by Jewish extremists as well. Yigal Amir's murder of Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin 25 and Baruch Goldstein's massacre of
thirty Palestinians at a Hebron mosque25 1 highlight the threat that
250 See AMNON RUBINSTEIN, FROM HERZL TO RABIN: THE CHANGING FACE OF
ZIONISM 147-50 (2000) (explaining the influence that a rabbinical decision had
on Yigal Amir's assassination of Prime Minister Rabin).
251 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 559.
Why did Baruch Goldstein, the fanatical Jewish settler from
Qiryat Arba, walk into Hebron's Cave of the Patriarchs on the
afternoon of February 24, 1994, and gun down Muslim
worshippers there, killing thirty of them and wounding scores of
others? I think it is because he had been listening to the silence
with which most Israelis had accepted the peace accord with
Arafat and it drove him crazy. Baruch Goldstein.. .understood that
the only way to break the silence was not with some garden-
variety act of terrorism...No, it required something so outrageous,
so unspeakable, that it would move masses of Palestinians to
react, which he hoped would trigger a massive Israeli counter-
reaction and suddenly the silent majorities, instead of being
passive and inert, would be mobilized, angry, and at each other's
throats. So he shot up one of the holiest sites of Islam.
Id.; see also RUBINSTEIN, supra note 250, at 136.
The settlement elite, the heads of the National Religious Party,
and the chief rabbis condemned the massacre. But immediately
following the slaughter, the voices of extremist rabbis who
praised the murderer and justified the murder, either explicitly or
implicitly, could be heard. Although the heads of the religious
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extreme Jewish fundamentalism poses to peace in the Middle East.
But, the major differences between these incidents and Palestinian
attacks are (1) that they were relatively isolated and not part of a
campaign of violence and (2) that there is little support in Israel for
them, as, in general, the Israeli government and the Israeli people
oppose the use of such tactics.252 Nevertheless, incitement on the
part of some Jewish settlers and fundamentalists still exists. The
forces that killed Yitzhak Rabin may present themselves again if a
peace process ever develops. Hence, incitement among Jewish
extremists must be curtailed as well, to proactively stop another
attack that may further poison the atmosphere and derail any hope
for peace.
While Israel has the power to stop Jewish extremism within
its borders, Islamic fundamentalism will always be a challenge for
Israel as it cannot solve the socioeconomic problems of the Arab
world.253 Prior to a peace agreement, the negotiating parties will
inevitably have to deal with both Islamic and Jewish religious
extremists who seek to derail negotiations and reverse the peace
process. However, a deal with the Palestinians and with Israel's
Arab neighbors may help quell the socioeconomic problems of the
Arab world that give rise to fundamentalism.254  A peace
agreement may "give the Arabs a stronger hand to deal with some
of their economic problems, reduce the ability of the
fundamentalists to blame every blight in their society on Israel, and
[perhaps] secure a Muslim majority ready to live and let live with
establishment denounced Goldstein's actions, they did not express
any reservations about their colleagues who justified them.
Id.
252 However, the religious Zionist community in Israel did not denounce the
tactics of Jewish extremists in a meaningful way. For example, Baruch
Goldstein's grave was turned into a "semi-shrine, the site of pilgrimages." See
RUBINSTEIN, supra note 250, at 138. Nevertheless, the Israeli government and
the Israeli police have arrested numerous extremists for incitement and plotting
to attack Arabs and the secular/moderate Israeli majority has opposed the Jewish
extremists. See id. at 130-56.
253 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 549.
254 See id.
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the Jews. ' ' 255 Moreover, peace with Israel has. direct economic
benefits for the Arab world, as evidenced by Egypt's receipt of
billions in foreign aid after its peace agreement with Israel and the
forgiving of $700 million of Jordanian debt after it signed its treaty
256with Israel. Decreased military expenditures in a time of peace
would make room for investment in infrastructure and education,
thereby strengthening the economy of any nation that made peace.
Furthermore, the stability itself would also bring in a new wave of
foreign investment. If Arab economies can grow after a peace
agreement, Islamic fundamentalism will become less alluring and
the threat of terrorism can be minimized. This, in turn, will
strengthen and reinforce peace in the region.
iv. Failed Leadership
It must be remembered that Israelis view any Arab
peace overture in the context of Anwar Sadat's
initiative. Israelis saw Sadat address their own
parliament; they saw him salute the Israeli flag; they
saw him kiss former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir
on the cheek and visit the Israeli Holocaust memorial
at Yad Vashem. What he did was so far-reaching, so
clear-cut in its recognition of Israelis, that no one could
challenge his sincerity. At the same time, Sadat, by
going to Jerusalem, did something so courageous that
Israelis could not help but take notice. He put himself
in a position where he could not afford to fail.
257
Perhaps the largest obstacle to Middle East peace is the flawed and
at times, impotent, leadership of the region. Currently, there are no
255 Id.
256 See id. at 557. Similarly, only months after the Oslo agreements, global
investment companies scouted both the Gaza Strip and Israel. See id. at 553.
257 FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 404.
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leaders like Anwar Sadat or Yitzhak Rabin that can command the
international respect, and possess the courage and foresight
necessary for compromise. Instead, the region is filled with
despotic regimes who only want to consolidate their power and
leaders who are either unwilling or unable to even negotiate for
peace.
To many Israelis, Yasser Arafat's rejection of former Prime
Minister Ehud Barak's peace proposal at Camp David in 2000
signified his unwillingness to compromise, his fear of his own
people, and his inability to act decisively at a crucial moment. In
the eyes of Israelis, Arafat's failure to offer a counterproposal
showed that he truly did not want peace. 258 Furthermore, Arafat's
incitement and continued support of terrorism during the second
Intifada reinforced their skepticism of his true intents.2 59  In
recognition of his inability to deliver and his continued support for
258 See Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: Three Blind Eyes, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 200 1, at A15.
What Mr. Arafat never did was talk to Israelis - go to them
directly, explain why he needed 100 percent, and demonstrate to
them why, if they accepted, Israel would be so much better off.
Oh, that's not Yasir Arafat, say his apologists. He's not Anwar el-
Sadat. Too bad. Mr. Sadat got 100 percent for a reason. Why
should Israelis now believe that if they give Mr. Arafat a state in
the West Bank, when he gets in trouble next time, say because he
can't run a modem country, he won't trigger another uprising
against Israel ....
Id.
259 See Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Vote for a Safe Place, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2001, at A19.
For years, Yasir Arafat has spoken out of both sides of his mouth.
Paying lip service to the peace of the brave in front of Western
audiences, Mr. Arafat has used his state-controlled news media to
foment hatred against Jews and call for the destruction of Israel.
While leaders like Anwar Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of
Jordan sought to prepare their peoples to live in peace with Israel,
Mr. Arafat chooses instead to praise suicide bombers as national
martyrs and preach a holy war to end the occupation of Palestine
in spite of the fact that nearly 99 percent of Palestinians no longer
live under Israeli rule but are under his own despotic regime.
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terrorism, Israel and the United States sidelined Arafat from 2002
to 2004, refusing to negotiate with him. Following Arafat's death
in November 2004, the new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas,
has taken some measures to improve relations with Israel, but it
remains to be seen whether he has enough legitimacy among his
own people to be empowered to fight terrorism and ultimately
make peace.
On the Israeli side, because he believes there is no
Palestinian partner for peace, Prime Minister Sharon has moved
away from compromise and negotiation and toward unilateral
actions, such as the Gaza disengagement plan and the security
fence. Palestinians are skeptical about his motives, especially
since the security fence encompasses some Palestinian lands,
divides some Palestinian towns, and may become a de facto border
that does not coincide with the "Green Line.' 260  Similarly,
Palestinians are wary of Sharon's motives, as he was architect of
the settlement movement and was defense minister during the
Sabra and Shatilla incident. 261 While Ariel Sharon's history of
fighting for Israel and fighting against terrorism may provide him
with the political cover to negotiate with the Palestinians, his
260 See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
261 During the Israel-Lebanon War, Lebanese Phalangists massacred hundreds of
Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in retaliation for their
leader's death and due to past tribal killings of their own. Israeli soldiers, which
were surrounding the camps, did not intervene to stop the Phalangists, even
though there is evidence that they knew what was going on. Ariel Sharon,
Israel's Minister of Defense at the time, was found to be "indirectly responsible"
for the death of the Palestinian refugees. FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 159-67
(discussing the details of the Sabra and Shatilla massacre); see also ARIEL
SHARON, WARRIOR 493-522 (1989) (In explaining the Kahan Commission's
findings over what occurred at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps, Sharon
states, "[R]egardless of the fact that so many people had known of the
Phalangists entering the neighborhoods without anticipating a massacre, I, as
defense minister, should have been more aware of the dangers and should have
taken action to preclude them. As a result, according to the commission, I
personally bore an 'indirect responsibility' for what happened.").
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reputation as a "hard-liner" may push Arabs away.
The leadership among the Arab world has been flawed as
well. Arab leaders have not prepared their citizens for peace with
Israel and instead continue to incite and blame their own domestic
problems on Israel:
In Israel, virtually every party favors a peace deal with
the Palestinians, and the debate is over how much to
compromise. In the Arab world, the debate is over
whether to compromise - with one group rejecting
peace with Israel on any terms, and others advocating
peace with Israel; but only if the Palestinians get 100
percent of what they want. So no Arab or Palestinian
leader has prepared his people for the Clinton deal, the
only deal that is possible - a deal in which neither gets
100 percent. Too many Arab regimes today are frail
and illegitimate, and cannot settle for anything less
than 100 percent. They are too afraid of their own
people. 262
Because the Arab world has not democratized and is ruled by
leaders who just barely cling to power,263 any overture towards
Israel that is against popular opinion will lead to resentment and
may lead to their removal from power. Hence, Arab governments
continue policies of opposing Israel, as a way to placate their
citizens and redirect anger away from their own authoritarian
regimes. This attitude must change in order for there to be Middle
East peace. Arab leaders must prepare their citizens for
coexistence with Israel and must teach them not to hate Jews or
262 Friedman, supra note 258.
263 However, new democratic movements have arisen in the Middle East.
Elections in Iraq and the Palestinian territories, Egypt's decision to hold multi-
candidate presidential elections in September 2005, and demonstrations in
Lebanon against the Syrian occupation have brought some promise for
democracy in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether any
of these events will actually lead to full scale democratization or whether they
are just isolated occurrences. See Thomas L. Friedman, New Signs on the Arab
Street, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at A11.
220 Vol. XXIII
The Forgotten Story
Israelis. The Arab governments should reject television programs,
like Horseman without a Horse and those that Hezbollah airs, as
they are counterproductive to peace. In short, Arab governments
must now lay the groundwork for an eventual peace by removing
the threats, incitement, and hatred that lies within the region.
Finally, President George W. Bush has failed to take a
leadership role in the Middle East conflict. Whereas his
predecessor, President Bill Clinton, was constantly engaged in
peace negotiations, President Bush has not demonstrated the same
willingness. President Bush sidelined Yasser Arafat, demanding
democratization and reforms within the Palestinian authority.
While this may have had its benefits, as Arafat was either
unwilling or unable to make peace or negotiate with the Israelis,
President Bush has not been sufficiently active in demanding that
the parties negotiate or try to solve the conflict. President Bush
should have demanded (and expected) more from the parties, such
as putting an end to settlement growth and an end to suicide
bombings and incitement. Instead of sending Middle East envoys,
President Bush could have traveled more often to the region to deal
with the issue. President Bush should have also used his
considerable power as the leader of the wealthiest and strongest
nation to cajole, coerce, or compel the parties to follow his "Road
Map" to peace. At the very least, such efforts would have gained
Bush credibility as someone who cares about ending the conflict.
If the parties ever decide to negotiate, the credibility of the
president is necessary to effectively mediate the dispute. However,
the way it stands now, President Bush has little credibility in the
region and his unwillingness to become more engaged is
detrimental to peace.
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C. Likelihood of an Arab-Israeli Peace
With the current political backdrop, peace seems unlikely
in the Middle East. Even if Israel carries through with its
disengagement plan and security (separation) barrier, quiet is not
assured. Such plans manage the situation and may reduce tension
and violence, but they do not result in peace. Arafat's rejection of
Barak's offer and the ongoing Palestinian Intifada, have both
silenced the now-jaded peace movement in Israel. Palestinian
society remains fragmented and volatile - Yasser Arafat is dead,
the Palestinian Authority is in shambles, and no one seems able or
willing to control the terrorist organizations. The Intifada
continues, the Israeli occupation remains, and both Israelis and
Palestinians have seemingly accepted the continuation of the
conflict.
Tensions in the region since the Intifada, the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 and the war in Iraq have further polarized the
world. The United States is increasingly viewed in the Arab world
as an enemy of Islam and as biased towards Israel. Arab
governments are seen by the Americans and Israelis as reluctant to
stop terrorism, as havens for terrorists and their supporters, and as
contributing to anti-American, anti-Israeli feelings. The European
Union and the United Nations are viewed by Israel as being too
quick to condemn Israeli actions to stop terrorism, but too
unwilling to condemn the terrorists themselves. France and
Germany have criticized the United States for being too
uninvolved with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and too eager to go
to war with Iraq. There seems to be little consensus over how to
solve the problems of the region and it seems like the parties to the
conflict are farther than ever from peace. Whereas the early to
mid- 1990s were a time of hope, with the Oslo accords and the
Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement, the last several years have
witnessed the Intifada, 9/11, the war in Afghanistan, the war in
Iraq, and terrorist attacks around the world. Hope has been
replaced by the hard reality that peace is currently nowhere in
sight.
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There will not be a comprehensive Middle East peace in the
foreseeable future. Perhaps peace will be possible in ten or twenty
years, but the situation has gotten worse in the last few years,
rather than better. While actions like Libya's nuclear disarmament
and Israel's withdrawal from Gaza are encouraging for the region,
there are still too many problems to be fixed. Iraqi reconstruction,
Iran's nuclear program, the weaknesses of Arab governments,
terrorism, Hezbollah's activity in southern Lebanon and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict will all contribute to the instability of the
region over the next decade. As such, it is increasingly doubtful
that the Israelis and the Palestinians and Israel and the Arab world
will agree to peace. Because the best hope for reparations for
Jewish refugees is with a claims commission, and since such an
entity is conditioned upon a regional peace agreement, it is
doubtful that the Jewish refugees will ever be compensated for
their expulsion from the Arab world.
Section IV: Conclusion
The likelihood of compensation for the Jewish refugees is
slim, as Middle East peace is years away and no remedy other than
a claims commission would effectively redress the Jewish
refugees. Nevertheless, public acknowledgment of the wrongs that
they suffered may assure at least a minimum level of justice, where
there was none before. The history of Middle Eastern Jewry has
long been ignored. As Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations
Dan Gillerman observed:
Since 1947, there have been over 681 UN resolutions
on the Middle East conflict, including 101 that refer
directly to the plight of Palestinian refugees. Not one
of these resolutions even mentions the plight of Jewish
refugees, let alone calls for action to address their
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suffering.
264
The politics of the day have emphasized the Palestinian plight, to
the exclusion of what happened to the 850,000 Jews that once lived
in Arab countries. Both groups have legitimate claims, yet only
one has received attention. Peace may happen one day in the
Middle East. Palestinian refugees may get compensation. Yet,
without a proper discussion of the Jews from the Arab world, there
can be no just settlement of the refugee situation in the Middle
East.
Many refugees are still alive, yet the population dwindles
with time. With the state of the Middle East today, it is unlikely
that any will receive compensation or even an apology for the
abuses that they suffered. Nevertheless, it is the world
community's responsibility to refocus the debate, so that the issue
becomes whether there will be justice for the refugees and not
whether one claim is superior or subordinate to another. The
Jewish refugees have legitimate claims that have yet to be heard.
Hopefully, the world will not forget them again.
264 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ambassador Dan Gillerman,
supra note 85.
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